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ABSTRACT
Culturally related economic development offers the potential for achieving politically
acceptable redevelopment objectives. A variety of public intervention forms are available
to subsidize the development of these cultural facilities. This thesis critically examines the
potential for incentive zoning as one form of intervention to encourage the development of
cultural facilities in Boston's Midtown Cultural District.
A cost-benefit analysis evaluates the financial, fiscal and social consequences of
incentive zoning for the major groups impacted by the Midtown Cultural District Plan. The
analysis seeks to determine the feasibility for constructing cultural facilities based on the
guidelines proposed by the recently released draft zoning for the Midtown Cultural District.
By assuming different market conditions the model simulates varying development climates
and determines the benefits and costs to the private developer, the city and the community
at corresponding levels of development.
This thesis concludes that the prospect for zoning to provide incentive for cultural
development is limited consistent with urban design objectives in the District. With the
exception of strong market conditions and relatively low cultural costs for small
development parcels, the incentive zoning as currently proposed is ineffective. While these
benefits are likely to expand over time, initial stimulation of cultural development is
contingent on the public sector assuming an increased level of risk in development of the
area.
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INTRODUCTION
Boston's proposal for a Midtown Cultural District in the twenty-five blocks south of
Downtown Crossing is unparalleled in its redevelopment vision. It is occurring in the
context of a nationwide trend of downtown cultural development, and it has wider support
from the public and private sector than two decades of plans for this area ever had. The
scheme has been in the works since 1986, but the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA)
only recently released preliminary zoning regulations and a draft plan. Yet, before cultural
development objectives can ever successfully occur, many components to the development
strategy must be further refined. The most critical of these is how zoning will be used to
encourage new development in keeping with the broader objectives of the Cultural District.
The objective of this thesis is to explore the issues that make development of cultural
districts unique, focusing on Boston's proposed Midtown Cultural District, and to evaluate
incentive zoning as one form of public sector intervention to encourage cultural
development. The objective is not to comment on the economic benefits of an arts-related
revitalization strategy, but rather to provide a quantified analysis of tradeoffs between
the provision of cultural facilities and the costs of obtaining them through incentive
zoning.
Part I of this thesis is a description of cultural districts and issues related to their
development.
Chapter 1 provides background on the changing role of the arts and a framework for
conceptualizing the recent manifestation of culturally-related economic development. Five
forms of cultural development are identified as a result of reviewing the approach of
twenty-two representative cities to the development of cultural facilities. In some of these
cases, an explanation of ownership, financing, and management issues is offered to
illustrate the different ways cities have approached the arts-related development. Although
I
these examples illustrate vast differences in the range of cultural development, there are
also many similarities. Understanding of these comparisons provides a significant base for
cities that, like Boston, are still in the planning stages for cultural development.
Chapter 2 is an in-depth description of Boston's proposed Midtown Cultural District.
This chapter traces the twenty years of planning for the area, planning that has occurred
without the realization of one new cultural facility. Although the current Plan for the
District appears to have far more unified support than previous planning efforts, it still
faces legal and public review before becoming implementable.
Chapter 3 is an analysis of the issues pertaining to realization of Boston's Midtown
Cultural District from the perspective of major interest groups. Because the District is in
the process of development, it is an appropriate moment to attempt to understand the many
issues associated with cultural district development.
Chapter 4 discusses forms of public sector intervention that may facilitate
development of the Cultural District. Assuming that the arts community is now becoming
an active participant in the development process, public support for the arts must adapt to
adequately provide resources for this new role. This chapter highlights the different land
use and financial tools that might be used for development of the Midtown Cultural
District.
Of the forms of land use and financial public intervention identified in Chapter 4,
incentive zoning is the primary form of intervention proposed for development of cultural
facilities in Boston's Midtown Cultural District. It is potentially the most controversial of
these techniques since its application is dependent on the discretionary power of the BRA.
Furthermore, incentive zoning may have the greatest physical ramifications on the built
environment. Because of the importance of these issues, Part II of this thesis is an
evaluation of the application of incentive zoning to the Midtown Cultural District.
Chapter 5 describes the analytical model that is used to evaluate the impacts of
incentive zoning for the Midtown Cultural District. This model draws heavily from Jerold
Kayden's research on incentive zoning in New York City.I
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 evaluate the consequences of incentive zoning for the three major
groups impacted by the Midtown Cultural District Plan. These chapters are not intended to
be an exhaustive list of the impacts of incentive zoning. Rather, they illustrate the range
of potential implications and the importance of differentiating impacts by interest group.
Chapter 6 is an analysis of the private developer's perspective. This chapter
questions the ability of the currently conceived incentive zoning proposal to provide
sufficient incentive to developers so that they will willingly meet development objectives of
the Midtown Cultural District.
Chapter 7 analyzes the consequences of incentive zoning from the city's perspective.
This chapter evaluates the increased revenues associated with the public sector benefit of
incentive zoning and also seeks to identify other, more qualitative impacts which are
equally significant and frequently overlooked.
Chapter 8 is a qualitative analysis of the impacts of incentive zoning from the
perspective of other interest groups of the District. Because incentive zoning has different
impacts on different community groups, their interests may be in competition with one
another. These tradeoffs are particularly important to identify separately in order to
understand the range of potential perspectives.
Chapter 9 concludes the analysis by discussing particular policy issues raised by the
research findings. It offers recommendations and specific concerns that must be addressed
for successful cultural development in the District.
I Jerold S. Kayden, Incentive Zoning in New York City: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,
Policy Analysis Series, Number 201, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, (1978).
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PART I
CHAPTER 1
CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
BACKGROUND
The emergence of the arts as a dominant component of growth strategies for the
revival of central cities is a relatively recent phenomenon. The arts have historically
played a significant role as the focus of learning and leisure for the social elite and
affluent urban classes. Virtually all art forms were originally dependent on wealthy
patronage or public commissions. The arts were seen as complementary to daily life,
enhancing its quality and the well-being of urban centers, but not as having any active
involvement in economic revitalization or development.
Today the role of the arts is changing, as Edelman states:
The arts should not be conceived as a merely symbolic aspect of urban culture,
but as material shapers of cities, as an emerging arena of instrumental politics.2
The circumstances responsible for this changing role are many and there is little consensus
among those active in the field of the arts and economic development as to what the key
factors are.
As background, it is worthwhile to explain some of the more commonly cited reasons
responsible for this emerging role. Federal policy since the 1960's has increasingly
emphasized the importance of corporate, foundation and government support for the arts.
And to a greater extent, this support has been directed to the use of the arts to stimulate
downtown development rather than simply to the arts for arts sake since the late 1970's.3
Although the public sector has largely been motivated by factors as civic pride, other
2 J. Allen Whitt, "Mozart in the Metropolis, The Arts Coalition and the Urban
Growth Machine," in Urban Affairs Quarterly, Volume 23, Number 1, (September 1987), p.
17.
3 Whitt, "Mozart in the Metropolis, The Arts Coalition and the Urban Growth
Machine," p. 19.
conditions such as spurring new development, attracting new businesses, and competing with
other cities are frequently cited as motivating criteria for the primarily local focus of
public investment. 4 Galaskiewicz states that for the private sector, considerations
regarding civic and social responsibility and public relations became increasingly important
and were significant forces in motivating commitment from the business sector. 5
Growing corporate contributions indicated both a new level of commitment based on
business strategy and a new joint venture approach to supporting cultural organization with
the public sector. As a result of this increased level of public and private support, the
arts, underwent what has been referred to by many as an "explosion of growth in the
arts". Michael Pittas, director of the Design Arts Program of the National Endowment of
the Arts, stated in 1983:
Over the past two decades, the United States has experienced a cultural growth
unequaled in its history, and possibly beyond any in the history of western
civilization. In the short span of just over twenty years, we have seen the
number of American dance companies multiply ten times, the number of small
professional theater companies multiply twenty times, and the creation of
countless new museums, galleries, studios and other spaces in which our artists
can produce and exhibit work.6
The demand for new facilities eventually led to the provision of physical structures for the
arts as a critical issue in development. In older urban areas where vacant land was more
scarce, the issue of providing artist space often provided the focal point for redevelopment.
The increased realization of the potential for economic benefits reinforced the role of
the arts in downtown redevelopment strategies. Not only were there social benefits to
4 Whitt, "Mozart in the Metropolis, The Arts Coalition and the Urban Growth
Machine," p. 16.
5 Whitt, "Mozart in the Metropolis, The Arts Coalition and the Urban Growth
Machine," p. 18.
6 Whitt, "Mozart in the Metropolis, The Arts Coalition and the Urban Growth
Machine," pp. 22-23.
including cultural facilities, but, it was argued, other related urban development objectives
could be met as well including increased employment, tax revenues, retail sales, and
tourism. Critic, Harold Schonberg, reinforces this concept:
Cultural centers have been responsible for the growth of previously
underdeveloped areas in the vicinity of the center. They have attracted
developers, small businesses, and allied artistic enterprises, such as galleries and
art movie houses. They have meant a tremendous upgrading of property values,
more people downtown, more tax revenue for the city. The arts in America are
big business.7
In Boston, for example, it has been estimated that non-profit cultural organizations had an
overall impact of 500 million dollars on the economy in 1986.8 Furthermore, the arts
represent a politically acceptable form of urban development capable of creating a common
ground around which the traditionally diverse interests involved in the development process
might be able to coalesce. 9
Out of this new demand for cultural facilities and the recognition of the role arts can
play as a politically acceptable strategy for urban growth has emerged the concept of
cultural districts. In general, cultural districts are a combined public and private sector
attempt to collectively bring about the development of cultural facilities that are
instrumental to economic development. In some cases, these developments provide an array
of cultural experiences- -from street performers and informal experimental theaters to
facilities for more established veteran performing arts groups in conjunction with a
multitude of commercial uses. In others, they consist of the renovation of a single historic
7 Urban Land Institute, Cultural Facilities in Mixed-Use Developments, (Washington,
D.C., 1984), p. 11.
8 Ellen L. Holbrook, The Economic Impact of the Arts on the City of Boston,
(ARTS/BOSTON and the City of Boston Office of Arts & Humanities, 1988), p. 1.
9 Whitt, "Mozart in the Metropolis, The Arts Coalition and the Urban Growth
Machine," p. 16.
theater or the development of a new cultural center. Regardless of scale, these cultural
developments represent a move away from the monolithic isolated symbolic art centers of
the past to the development of a synergy with commercial activities.
The existence of these diverse cultural districts is a direct result of a broader
perspective on the arts. Had it not been for a climate that sought to provide a more
accessible cultural experience the cultural district notion probably would never have
emerged. Harry S. Parker, III, director of the Dallas Museum of Art, comments on the role
of art institutions in cultural districts:
What the arts have to take into account is the new middle class base of arts in
America. The arts have become much more egalitarian than before, not only by
opening up to the minorities. The big revolution has been opening the arts to
the middle class. Art is as middle class as hell, and the arts district is about
the middle class: getting middle class families to come down here. The best
way to get them here is with the arts equivalent of an Epcot Center.10
Despite the increased level of public and private commitment to arts, the traditional
forms of financial support subsidizing operating expenses are inadequate to meet the more
demanding costs of physical development or renovation of arts facilities. As a result, the
increasing complexity of arts-related mixed-use projects has called for extensive
involvement by the public sector. A recent Urban Land Institute publication stated:
These ambitious developments pose too great a financial burden for the private
sector to bear alone, and because the scope of public benefits desired has grown
so large, many steps are required beyond the traditional public sector techniques.
Zoning incentives, infrastructure improvements, tax abatements, and write-downs
thus have played key roles in most mixed use developments.I I
Estimates state that arts-related development projects command a rent of fifteen to twenty
10 Partners for Livable Places, Art Spaces and Economic Development, Experience in
Six Cities, (Washington, D.C., 1986), p. II-A-8.
11 Urban Land Institute, Cultural Facilities in Mixed-Use Developments, p. 13.
percent higher than a single use commercial development, but initiating such development
entails much higher exposure to risk than single use projects.1 2 Without the mutual
cooperation and support of the public and private sectors, mixed-use cultural projects
would probably never have emerged.13
FORMS OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
There are five forms of cultural development: Cultural Facility, Mixed-Use Building,
Mixed-Use Development, Cultural Center, and Cultural District.14 In Appendix Exhibit 1-1
eleven cities are classified according to the form of cultural development they have used.
The cases are differentiated both by the scale of cultural development and by the degree
of public sector control in facilitating the ultimate project. The complexity of issues
pertaining to design, financing, management and operations typically increases as the
project becomes larger. The column headed "Public Sector Tools" illustrates the range of
public sector intervention beyond the traditional forms of support that encourage cultural
development (Appendix Exhibit I -1). Three cities representative of cultural district
development are discussed in greater detail to further define the form of development most
relevant to the Boston context.
The first form for cultural development, the Cultural Facility, is a single arts-related
use in a single building or several arts-related structures at a single site. This type of
development includes both the renovation of existing facilities--the Shubert Theater in New
12 Partners for Livable Places, Art Spaces and Economic Development, Experience in
Six Cities, p. II-A-35.
13 Urban Land Institute, Cultural Facilities in Mixed-Use Developments, p. 14
14 These forms were based on a survey of the available literature on culturally based
economic development. Although in the literature many of these examples were referenced
according to a broad definition of cultural district development, for the purpose of this
analysis to differentiate types of cultural development, they were classified as separate
forms.
Haven, Connecticut--or the construction of new facilities for cultural use--the addition to
the Portland Museum of Art, in Portland, Maine. This form of cultural development is the
least complex of the all the illustrations presented because it has simpler financing,
operation and management arrangements than do other types that integrate several uses.
Typically the finance, management, and operation of such developments are handled by the
arts groups themselves in conjunction with foundation or philanthropic supporters.
A Mixed-Use Building is the second form of cultural development. These projects
consist of a single building or site which combines a cultural with a commercial use.
Perhaps the best known example is New York City's Museum of Modem Art where a
residential tower and the Museum are now part of a single mixed-use building. The
financial relationship between the two uses may be limited to development above as of
right conditions for the provision of art-related uses. Or, the relationship may consist of
an operational association, in which the income-generating use cross-subsidizes the annual
expenses of the cultural use. Depending on how the financial and operational issues are
handled, an ongoing management relationship may or may not be necessary. 1 5
Mixed-Use Developments, the third form of cultural development, consist of a
carefully programmed mix of commercial and cultural uses unified in a multi-building
complex. Frequently this development form includes several different types of income-
producing uses and a wider range of cultural uses than the two previously identified types.
Because these developments are often intended to provide viability and strength to an
underutilized or blighted downtown area, the local redevelopment authority (or comparable
city agency) is often significantly involved. In some cases, such as the proposed Yerba
BAna project in San Francisco, the cultural facility was included as part of the
development project from conception. In others, such as the Horton Plaza project in San
15 Urban Land Institute, Cultural Facilities in Mixed-Use Developments, p. 23.
Diego, the arts-related space was only added after the commercial component was defined
to respond to additional city objectives. The cultural facility was not always central to
the original development scheme, but long-term success of the project depends on a
coordinated operation and management structure which carefully integrates the interests of
arts and income-producing uses as well as city redevelopment objectives.
As the forth form of cultural development, the Cultural Center is characterized by a
concentration of diverse cultural facilities in a tightly defmed newly developing area. The
Winston Square Arts Complex in Winston-Salem, North Carolina contains theaters, galleries,
an art school, and a performing arts center as well as commercial development such as
restaurants, an office building, hotels, and a retail mall. Cultural centers lack formal
boundaries, but appear to have evolved clearly defined edges and are frequently associated
with transitional renovation areas. 16 Winston-Salem, for example,
[after] numerous unsuccessful attempts to save a declining central business
district, decided in the late 1970's to use the arts as a focus for redevelopment.
The city has since created a multimillion-dollar downtown 'cultural district.'"7
Because the public and private sector have a mutual interest in the success of downtown
redevelopment projects, operation and management responsibilities are typically shared.
This form pertains to a relatively large number of different development projects, however,
the complexities of finance, operation and management issues are not as complicated as the
Cultural District form because the development and design objectives are less carefully
defined.
The fifth form of cultural development is the Cultural District, a formally defined
area with public policies specifically established to encourage the preservation or further
16 Although this example is similar to what is called the Cultural District form in
this categorization, it is differentiated because it does not have legal boundaries.
17 Whitt, "Mozart in the Metropolis, The Arts Coalition and the Urban Growth
Machine," p. 25.
development of "a special and desirable cultural character." 18 Arts-related uses attracting
visitors to the area and income-producing commercial uses providing economic vitality are
encouraged to create a cohesive image for the district as a whole. Opportunities for
display and presentation by local artists are more common with this form of cultural
development than with others because it includes both formal and informal cultural
facilities. Since individual projects within the district's boundaries are developed, operated
and managed separately, the number of participants in the development of the district is
apt to be high. Coordination of interests and objectives, while assuring success of cultural
district objectives, is extremely time consuming and is more demanding than in any of the
other forms described.
There are three different Cultural District models: the Historic Renovation Cultural
District, the Incentive Zoning Cultural District and the Comprehensive Planning Cultural
District. Although each of these districts shares common features, the public sector
objectives differ.
Historic Renovation Cultural Districts are motivated by historic renovation rather than
new development. The strategy is based on restoring a deteriorated downtown by making
historically significant cultural buildings the focal points of the district. This model has
its origins in the historic district concept, but it has far broader implications as it is
intended to meet both economic and artistic objectives. 19
Playhouse Square in Cleveland, Ohio is an example of a renovation-based cultural
district. Its master plan for over 60 acres of land proposes a hotel, office, specialty retail,
restaurant, condominiums, and apartments, but its cornerstone is the historic renovation of
a group of three historically significant 1920's theaters. The Ohio, State and Palace
theaters form Playhouse Square and together comprise the 'largest theater restoration
18 Urban Land Institute, Cultural Facilities in Mixed-Use Developments, p. 23.
19 Urban Land Institute, Cultural Facilities in Mixed-Use Developments, p. 24.
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project in the world" offering over 7,000 seats, compared to the 6,900 in Washington's
Kennedy Center. 2 0
The capital financing for the renovation of Playhouse Square came largely from a
two-phase 27-million dollar fundraising campaign. Additional monies came from such
sources as the National Endowment for the Arts, Urban Development Action Grants, the
Ohio Arts Council, the Economic Development Administration, state sources, area
foundations, and major corporations.21
The Ohio and State Theaters are owned by Cuyahoga County, and the Palace Theater
is privately owned, but all three theaters are managed and operated by the non-profit
Playhouse Square Foundation. The Foundation is also responsible for district management
and operation, ensuring developments are compatible with the objectives of the district, as
well as for obtaining necessary funding. The Foundation receives part of its revenue as
returns from the commercial projects it owns in the Square, and thereby it also benefits
from arts-related property appreciation.22
The Playhouse Square project is regarded as a major economic force for the
redevelopment of Cleveland's downtown. After fifteen years, the objectives for the project
have broadened from the original preservationist stance to the role of the project as a
substantial contributor to the city's economic future. However, had it not been for
substantial public investment, private corporations, a community foundation, and the local
government, its success probably would never have been possible. 2 3
20 Partners for Livable Places, Art Spaces and Economic Development, Experience in
Six Cities, p. II-F-5.
21 Partners for Livable Places, Art Spaces and Economic Development, Experience in
Six Cities, p. II-F-5.
22 Partners for Livable Places, Art Spaces and Economic Development, Experience in
Six Cities, p. II-F-12.
23 Partners for Livable Places, Art Spaces and Economic Development, Experience in
Six Cities, p. II-F- 19.
Incentive Zoning Cultural Districts leverage the development of cultural facilities
through trading off increased height development of more profitable commercial uses.
Because this type of district is based on a technique for encouraging cultural development,
it is not mutually exclusive of the other forms described.
The New York Special Theater District was established in 1969 to encourage the
inclusion of legitimate theaters in new office development and is the best existing example
of an Incentive Zoning Cultural District. Located from Sixth to Eighth Avenues and from
57th to 40th Streets, the District seeks to preserve, protect and promote the existing
quality of the area by trading reasonable zoning bonuses for otherwise unobtainable public
amenity i.e., new legitimate theaters. 2 4 The District is based on the premise that
Broadway theater is an essential part of the New York City experience, contributing both
leisure and economic benefits. 2 5 By 1975, three developments had taken advantage of the
bonus system resulting in the Minskoff with 1,650 seats, the Uris Theater with 1,800 seats,
the Circle in the Square with 636 seats, the American Place Theater with 350 seats, and a
120 seat cabaret theater. 2 6
In 1982, the Special Theater District was reinforced by a provision of the Special
Midtown Zoning District which required a special permit for the demolition of an
historically designated theater and granted a bonus for the renovation of an existing
theater, similar to the incentive system of the 1969 plan. Since the implementation of the
Midtown District, no demolition permits have been filed and one theater rehabilitation
24 Beverly Moss Spatt, Zoning: the Political Milieu Case Studies in New York City,
1966-1973, (New York University, School of Urban and Regional Planning, PHD Dissertation,
1976), p. 231.
25 Robert E. Davis and Jon Weston, The Special District Zoning Concept in New
York City, (Department of Urban Affairs & Policy Analysis, Center for New York City
Affairs, New School For Social Research, 1975), pp. 4-5.
26 Robert E. Davis and Jon Weston, The Special District Zoning Concept in New
York City, p. II.
bonus has been approved.
The Special Zoning District provision entitles a developer to apply for an additional
twenty percent in floor area ratio in return for the inclusion of a legitimate theater or
other form of public amenity contributing to the District's objectives. It also allows a
bonus in exchange for the rehabilitation of an existing historically designated theater. The
specific amount is determined by negotiation with the City Planning Commission based on a
cost estimate of the particular amenity. Although the maximum bonus the developer is
eligible for is twenty percent, there is no pre-specified bonus scale related to the cost of
the corresponding public amenity. 2 8
The success of the New York Special Theater District in accomplishing its stated
goals has been mixed. The District has been responsible for the development of the above
theaters, but the impact of deserted nighttime office buildings, poses a threat to the
vitality the District seeks to promote. The impact of additional height and bulk on
environmental conditions increasing shadow and wind also creates negative daytime and
nighttime consequences. Additionally, a successful cultural district is dependent not only
on the existence of physical structures, but also on a range of services and activities
contributing to the cultural experience. The New York Special District concept does little
to address these underlying concerns, but rather focuses on development of physical
resources. Beverly Moss Spatt, a member of the New York City Planning Commission, has
stated her disgust with the Special District regulations:
This [the offering of increased density as a bonus] turns the clock back with a
vengeance... The reliance on incentive zoning without any overall basic objectives
27 Department of City Planning, City of New York, Midtown Development Review,
July, 1987, p. 15.
28 Robert E. Davis and Jon Weston, The Special District Zoning Concept in New
York City, p. 6.
and strategy reflects a callous misuse of the zoning power.2 9
A Comprehensive Planning Cultural District is the most sophisticated of models
described because it combines a carefully integrated mixed-use proposal with a relatively
large legally defined area. Not only does this model include developments that combine
large scale commercial and formal cultural facilities, it also includes informal experimental
theaters and may also include programmed street performers (musicians, jugglers, mimes,
artists, etc).
The Dallas Arts District is the most representative example of the Comprehensive
Planning model. This District included over sixty acres of vacant land targeted for
expanding the commercial real estate market. Its original market literature proposed it as
a:
people-oriented area, ..[featuring] a varied atmosphere, reflected in numerous
festivals and special events; aesthetically pleasing building design and
construction; office buildings, some residential structures and facilities devoted to
the arts, and numerous landscaped outdoor spaces, with Flora Street serving as
the area's interconnecting link.3 0
The District is envisioned to ultimately accommodate most of the city's cultural
institutions. 3 1 To date, the area includes the Dallas Museum of Art, the Morton H.
Meyerson Symphony Center, the Arts Magnet at Booker T. Washington High School, the
Dallas Theater Center, and the LTV Pavilion part of a Trammel Crow office tower.
The District was established in 1983 by a City ordinance specifying permissable uses,
height limits, setbacks, ground floor uses, facade treatment, and construction requirements,
29 Robert E. Davis and Jon Weston, The Special District Zoning Concept in New
York City, p. 13.
30 Partners for Livable Places, Art Spaces and Economic Development, Experience in
Six Cities, p. II-A-42.
31 Urban Land Institute, Cultural Facilities in Mixed-Use Developments, p. 21.
"all designed to give the district a pedestrian orientation." 3 2 Although the ordinance
encourages eighteen-hour activity by establishing a required threshold ratio for retail to
office development and encouraging arts-related retail, it does not mandate the inclusion of
cultural facilities within new commercial development.
The financing for both capital costs and operating expenses for the cultural facilities
of the District are largely borne by the City. In 1979, the City decided to finance 75
percent of the cost of acquiring land from the proceeds of bond issues for "major" new
arts facilities and 60 percent of the construction cost. 3 3 The City also provides three
forms of aid to support the operation of the District. First, direct support for
programming and operation costs is available in the form of service contracts. All
institutions with the exception of the Magnet School in the District, receive this aid.
Second is indirect aid in the form of payment of an institution's utility bills. Only those
institutions that own their buildings are eligible for this form of support. As an exception,
the Theater Center owns its building, but it is now obligated to pay its own utilities, as an
initial attempt to move away from institutional reliance on City funds. Lastly, money for
the maintenance of institutions' buildings and grounds from the City's Department of
Building Services is a source of assistance for owners of cultural facilities. The Museum
32 Partners for Livable Places, Art Spaces and Economic Development, Experience in
Six Cities, p. II-A-3.
33 Partners for Livable Places, Art Spaces and Economic Development, Experience in
Six Cities, p. II-A-24.
"Major is defined as being any cultural agency that meets eight criteria: full time,
professional management and cultural or artistic personnel; in operation at least five years;
an annual operating budget of more than $350,000; programs that are consistent with the
medium and mission of the organization and that increasingly reflect the pluralism of the
city; a diversely representative board of directors; demonstrated community outreach
programs; a primary focus on providing services to citizens of Dallas; and non-profit
501(c)(3) status with the Internal Revenue Service."
and the Theater Center are the only eligible recipients for this form of aid.3 4
The District is managed by District property owners, arts professionals that operate
and program district institutions and area arts supporters.
The Arts District Management Association, a 501(c)(6) trade association of district
property owners, promotes cooperation among land holders (or those with leasehold
interests) and is responsible for management service contracts to assure competent
management and operation of the District. Property owners vote by the block and their
vote is weighted according to the value of their property in relation to the value of the
total block. The Association consists of elected directors, two directors appointed by the
mayor, and one appointment by each of the eight non-profit organizations in the district.
According to its incorporation agreement, the Management Association is empowered to
assess property owners a fee to accomplish its stated purposes.
The Dallas Arts District Foundation, a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization is responsible
for programming the District, marketing and sponsoring district activities, administering
financial support for the District, and coordinating District arts activities with those
elsewhere in the city. The Foundation's Board of Directors consists primarily of arts
professionals from the major institutions in the District and those that may potentially
locate in the District.
Friends of the Dallas Arts District, also a 501(c)(3) non-profit, is intended to provide
both individual and corporate support for the foundation and volunteer assistance for
district activities. Two classes of corporate and individual membership exist ranging from
100 dollars to 5,000 dollars for a corporation and 25 dollars to 1,000 dollars for an
individual. 3 5
34 Partners for Livable Places, Art Spaces and Economic Development, Experience in
Six Cities, p. II-A-27.
35 Partners for Livable Places, Art Spaces and Economic Development, Experience in
Six Cities, p. II-A-23.
The most important component to this management structure is one individual who
serves as a coordinator between the three organizations. Philip O'Brien Montgomery, Jr.,
M.D. has no legal authority, but he is regarded as the brainchild of the Arts District. As
chairperson of the District committee that preceded the present management organization,
along with the staff of the Central Dallas Association, he has been critical to establishing
the District and assuring that its development remains on the forefront of the political
agenda. 3 6
Today, the Dallas Arts District is regarded with great optimism, but because it
remains largely undeveloped it lacks a strong identity. Although some developers indicate
they believe incentives are necessary to encourage development, others state the address of
the Arts District alone is enough to convey the additional value necessary to encourage
future development. Others criticize the voluntary nature of the Planned Development
District ordinance. Because the ordinance does not require developers to include arts or
cultural space, they question the likelihood of developers providing them voluntarily. The
District clearly has a long way to go before it meets its stated objectives, but City support
for the District is unprecedented and truly represents a long term commitment toward
achieving civic prominence.
Boston's Midtown Cultural District Plan is a hybrid of the three cultural district
models discussed above. Like Dallas, it is comprehensive in its development and zoning
strategy. Like New York, it looks to incentive zoning to encourage the development of
cultural facilities. And, like Cleveland, preservation of historic cultural resources is
important to give the Plan meaning and a tie to the area's rich historical past. Like all
the others, Boston's Plan is based on the dynamics of the relationship between cultural
activity and the urban processes of economic growth.
36 Partners for Livable Places, Art Spaces and Economic Development, Experience in
Six Cities, p. II-A-24.
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Exhibit 2-1
SUMMARY
Each of the forms represents a different approach toward cultural development.
None were motivated by abstract notions; rather, they were based on achieving concrete
objectives--preserving historic structures, providing needed cultural facilities, or
encouraging business development. Even though each promoted the development of a
concentration of arts facilities and activities for different local reasons and in different
ways, they all share the belief "that there is a reciprocal relationship between cultural
investments and investment in downtown retail and office development." 3 7
Boston's Plan for the Midtown Cultural District is based on the strength of a cultural
vision to provide viability and coherency to the redevelopment of a historically blighted
area. Harold R. Snecdof, an eminent cultural and development planner, comments:
What Boston is doing fits into a national context. It is not a test case. There
are lessons to be learned from experiences in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Pittsburgh. Now is the time for Boston to do something truly important in its
downtown area.3 8
The next chapter is a description of Boston's Plan and the circumstances which led to its
existence.
37 Partners for Livable Places, Art Spaces and Economic Development, Experience in
Six Cities, p. 1-6.
38 The Boston Globe, 4/88.
CHAPTER 2
BOSTON'S MIDTOWN CULTURAL DISTRICT
Boston's Midtown Cultural District Plan and the proposed zoning regulations that will
make it possible have just been made public and they are about to undergo community
review prior to formal adoption. Therefore, the focus of this discussion is on the
historical evolution of this form of cultural development and the extent to which cultural
activity can be a catalyst for urban revitalization in Boston.
PLANNING CONTEXT
The Midtown Cultural District, as it is currently envisioned, encompasses
approximately 25 acres in the heart of downtown Boston (Exhibit 2-1). The District
stretches from the edges of the Boston Common to Downtown Crossing (Boston's retail
core) in the east, to Park Square in the west. It shares boundaries with Tufts University,
the New England Medical Center and the city's Chinatown, in the south. Within its
boundaries lie the "theater district," (a concentration of theaters some of which date back
to the nineteenth century), a number of other significant historic buildings, and the
Combat Zone (restyled the 'adult entertainment' district in a 1970's attempt to control its
growth). At the center of the District is the "hinge block," so-called because it is a
physical hinge between the residential Back Bay to the west and the commercial downtown
to the north. This block is bounded by Washington, Tremont, Stuart and Boylston Streets.
Major portions of the District are currently occupied by underutilized or vacant lots and
have been so for many years.
Like many defunct theater districts throughout the country, this District is in
proximity to the financial and business core of the city as well as to a number of
residential communities, including those in Bay Village, South Cove and Chinatown. The
area is well served by three of Boston's four subway lines, as well as by arterial highways
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and it is within walking distance of the South Station rail terminus.
Because the existing land uses are diverse and the area is sited near various city
resources, it seems that the area is ideally situated to become a thriving mixed-use district.
Yet, currently the physical and social fabric of the area is blighted. Once a center of
commerce and culture, decades of neglect have left many lots vacant or underutilized
casting doubt on its potential economic vitality. While pornographic activities in the
Combat Zone have contributed to this decline, making a relatively small part of the area
dangerous at night and empty during the day, it also lacks basic residential services and
currently houses only about 2,500 people.39 The District's historic street patterns remain,
but the physical surroundings have deteriorated; in numerous places buildings stand
abandoned and boarded up.
The area's most significant asset remains the numerous theaters scattered throughout
the District. Boston is one of few American cities that has a large concentration of
theaters within walking distance of one another. The appearance of play-houses along
lower Washington Street in the late nineteenth century allowed the area south of the
Boston Common to consolidate as a theater district. 4 0 With the construction of the
Tremont, Colonial, Majestic, Shubert and Wilbur theater within a span of just over two
decades at the turn of the century, the area was firmly established as the entertainment
center of the city. Through the early part of the 1900's there were as many as fifty
theaters in this area or nearby serving the demand of Boston's population for vaudeville
and drama.4 1
39 Boston Redevelopment Authority, Draft Midtown Cultural District Plan, April 1988.
40 Boston Redevelopment Authority, A Preliminary Report--Boston's Theater District:
A Program for Revitalization, May, 1979.
41 Vaudeville refers to stage entertainment offering a variety of short acts
originating in Boston in the 1880's.
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Many of the area's difficulties began in the Great Depression and continued after
World War II with the growth of Boston's suburbs and the slow decline of the state's
economy. In the post-war years only three legitimate theaters continued to operate. Since
that time there has been considerable rejuvenation of the theater in Boston. The gradual
resurgence of theater activity is a sign of changing times for the local economy as well as
for the arts in Boston. Today as many as eleven theaters may be active in the District at
any one time with an additional seven lying vacant, but a substantial portion of the
rejuvenation of the theater has taken place in other parts of Boston or across the river in
Cambridge with theater companies linking their futures more closely to the area's
universities.
Nevertheless, the current strong economy has the potential to carry reinvestment to
the Midtown area. According to figures released by the Boston Redevelopment Authority
(BRA), new development in the four year period 1984-1987 totalled five billion dollars in
Boston. But thus far only six percent of that investment has been directed to the Midtown
Cultural District.4 2 On the other hand, the nearby Financial District and the Back Bay,
the city's two traditional office centers have become saturated with development and
vacancy rates as low as three percent. The Midtown District, strategically located
between the two, has, as a result, become the location with the most potential for office
space expansion. A BRA office survey stated that 81 percent of the Back Bay firms
considering expansion would relocate in the Midtown area and eventually, office space rents
in the area are expected to rise to a level between those in the Financial District and
those in the Back Bay. 4 3
Along with these development pressures has come a new recognition of the increasing
contribution of arts-related activities to the local economy. According to one study, non-
42 Boston Redevelopment Authority, Draft Midtown Cultural District Plan, July 1988.
43 Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston Industry Office Study, 1987.
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profit cultural organizations were the city's largest employers with 4,100 full and part time
personnel in 1986.4 During that year over 7.6 million people attended non-profit cultural
events, more than double the number of people who attended professional sports without
even including commercial cultural events.
Paradoxically, more than fifty of the city's high quality performing and visual artists
groups are currently without regular access to performance, rehearsal, studio and gallery
space. They are forced to use cramped urban quarters or travel to adjacent neighborhoods,
but inevitably they are limited by the constraints of sharing facilities with other groups.
Thus, the proposed Midtown Cultural District must be seen in the context of the
larger economic and social forces in the city. The combined impact of these factors has
begun a transformation of the area. As Bruce Rossley, Commissioner of the City Office
Arts and Humanities, states
A few years ago, that was an area of the city most people wouldn't think of going.
For now at least 9,500 people a night beg to differ.4 5
With five hotels in or near the District, the area is also becoming a destination for
tourists and business travelers. Lafayette Place, completed in the mid 1980's, has provided
the necessary first step of private investment in the District. Meanwhile, the completion
of the State Transportation Building has provided an important initiative for public
investment in the southwest side of the District, and a performance space and a gallery
have opened on the first floor of this building. Competing for space in this changing area,
Chinatown businesses are expanding and looking to the Midtown District to provide
affordable retail opportunities. At the same time, activities in the Combat Zone have
shown a steady decline. During 1986 alone, 7 of 21 "adult-oriented establishments" were
44 Jeff McLaughin, "Study Finds Arts Contribute $500M to Hub's Economy," The
Boston Globe, January 6, 1988.
45 Patti Hartigan, "'Theater District: Ghost Town to Boom Town," The Boston Globe,
April 1, 1988, p. 42.
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driven out of business by more competitive uses, the home video market and stricter
license reinforcement. 4 6 Many of these have been replaced by Asian-owned businesses
serving neighboring Chinatown. The BRA is the semiautonomous public agency primarily
responsible for the planning and implementation of physical growth in Boston and the
central actor in defining the Midtown Cultural District. The BRA along with the Mayor's
Office of the Arts and Humanities (OAI) and various arts-based community groups,
neighborhood groups, downtown business groups and development groups is currently
working together to give form and character to the Midtown Cultural District initiative.
The breadth of involvement has given a strength to the currently emerging plans that
would have been impossible without that emerging consensus. Nevertheless, it is useful to
look at previous plans to revitalize the area, to learn from events since the 1960's, and to
examine how those efforts have affected the current Plan.
Previous Plans for the Area
The area proposed for Boston's Midtown Cultural District has had a long history of
attention from both the BRA and from others engaged in the process of planning and
development of Boston's center city. The current initiative differs from these earlier plans
and studies, both in terms of its physical boundaries and it broad objectives for cultural
development. Yet, according to Alex Twining, Senior Vice President for F.D. Rich, the
first development company to step forward in the Midtown Cultural District, these plans
"have consistently conveyed a message about the importance of this area to the future
growth of the city."4 7 They have often taken the arts into account without necessarily
bringing them into the forefront. Although these plans had little, if any, measurable
political or physical impact and little bearing on the impetus for today's initiative,
46 John King, "City Puts Culture at Center," The Boston Globe, 3/27/88.
47 Interview with Alex Twining, Senior Vice President, F.D. Rich Company, 4/6/88.
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the current vision does, in many ways, resemble those of the past. But never before had
the economics been so powerful nor was the arts community as unified in its support for
these efforts as they are today.
1960's and Urban Renewal
The 1960's was an unprecedented decade in the development of Boston; for the first
time vast sums of federal funds became available for center city and neighborhood
redevelopment. Never before had such massive projects been undertaken, nor had federal
and local resources been so plentiful. The first planning efforts for the area now called
the Midtown Cultural District began during this stage in Boston's history.
While all areas of the city were discussed in the 1965/1975 General Plan for the City
of Boston, in 1967 the BRA established the Urban Renewal Plan for the Central Business
District (CBD) including provisions for Washington Street and the hinge block area. The
basic objective of the Plan was to eliminate blighted conditions in order to facilitate sound
development and orderly growth.4 8 It sought to stimulate rehabilitation and renewal of the
CBD, promote public and private development and investment in the area through new
commercial facilities and capital improvements, and to strengthen the tax base. The area
identified by the CBD Plan included within its boundaries the area currently defined as the
Midtown Cultural District, and the Urban Renewal Plan report referred for the first time
to the hinge block as a "potential focal point of the theater and entertainment district and
an excellent location for activities connected with the visual and performing arts."4 9 The
hinge block area was seen as the focus for "new investment opportunities for commercial
facilities, transient and residential housing, and theater or related cultural uses" in order
to strengthen "the relationship between Downtown and the Back Bay business area through
48 Boston Redevelopment Authority, Central Business District Urban Renewal Plan, 1967.
49 Boston Redevelopment Authority, Central Business District Urban Renewal Plan, p.
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appropriate new development."
Over the next decade many components of the CBD Plan were implemented, but little
ever came of the proposal for the portion of lower Washington Street which is located in
the Cultural District. The gradual phasing out of the CBD Plan and the failure to
implement the hinge block concept were due in part to the declining availability of federal
urban renewal funds and in part to a City policy that gave priority to development in
other parts of the city. Moreover, it is not clear what type of support the proposal for
the block had from the arts community itself. (Today, through efforts of the Chamber of
Commerce and other private groups, the hinge block remains as an important central
concept in the Midtown Cultural District Plan.
In 1968 a group of Boston businessmen and professionals including trustees from
theatre, opera, and visual arts organizations formed the Boston Study Group Foundation to
examine the perilous financial situation of several major Boston arts organizations. The
group concluded that the financial difficulty of many of the existing organizations was
largely due to inadequate facilities. These facilities were either too small, outdated, too
poorly located, or too expensive to operate profitably for individual arts organizations.
Although new facilities were the Study Group's preferred alternative, expensive
construction costs made such a solution unattainable. As a result, the Group proposed the
construction of an arts complex, heavily dependent on government assistance with the close
integration of large scale real estate development, enabling cross-subsidization between
development revenues and the operating costs of constituent arts institutions. The concept
of an arts center, an example of the Cultural Facilities form referred to in the last
chapter, was particularly popular at this time as prominent arts centers such as Lincoln
Center in New York were being built throughout the country. But the Boston proposal
represented a somewhat different approach to cooperative ventures between local and
Lower Washington Street
federal government, private enterprise and the arts. 50
In January 1969 four thousand dollars was granted to the Boston Study Group
Foundation for further refinement of the arts complex idea in relation to the hinge block.
Cambridge Seven Associates, Inc., a Cambridge-based architectural firm, developed a
preliminary design for a single complex of substantial magnitude and density, with a far
greater proportion of highly profitable land uses than less profitable cultural-related uses.
The proposal recommended the integration of cultural components into a much larger,
financially vibrant real estate development. But the proposal was a design proposal and as
a result was silent on implementation. In this sense it played a role in beginning to shape
a kind of vision for the area that included the arts.
The 1970's
Throughout the 1970's the City of Boston continued to plan various public investment
strategies for the lower Washington Street area, emphasizing the importance of this area to
future downtown development.51 During this time numerous plans emerged for the
redevelopment of this blighted area, including the Park Plaza Urban Renewal Plan and a
proposal in the late 1970's targeting the hinge block for a new telecommunications
center. 5 2 However none of these plans ever got off the ground. 5 3
But other things were beginning to happen. Several reports that emphasized the
importance of the arts to the Boston economy were published, a significant change in the
zoning code occurred, and a massive public improvements program which sought to clean up
50 Boston Study Group Foundation, Hinge Block, A Proposed Cultural Complex For
Boston, 1969.
51 The Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce & City of Boston, Center City: Goals
and Guidelines for Revitalization, 1982.
52 David Luberoff, A History of Hinge Block Planning, Boston Redevelopment
Authority, June 1988.
53 Marie Gendron, "Midtown: New Plan for an Old Problem," The Boston Business
Journal, February 23, 1987, p. S1.
the adjacent downtown retail core was implemented.
The Park Plaza Urban Renewal Plan of 1970 was the City's major initiative to
continue rehabilitation plans for the central business district after urban renewal funds for
that area diminished. The hinge block along with another parcel on lower Washington
Street were part of phase II of the first development plan for Park Square. Under the
conditions specified by the development agreement, the BRA had three years to select a
developer for phase II after construction had begun on the phase I parcels. However,
because a development team has been selected only recently for phase I of the project,
phase II never has been initiated. Larry Dicara, President, Boston Theatre District
Association, notes the significance of this plan:
Because the Urban Renewal Plan remains in place, the Boston Redevelopment
Authority retains certain powers, such as those of eminent domain, which they
might not have in areas which were never made part of an urban renewal plan.5 4
In 1973 the Boston Redevelopment Authority published the report, Cultural and
Performing Arts Facility Development Program: Policy Guidelines and Recommendations.
The publication was important because it was the first time that a coherent argument had
been made concerning the public benefits associated with cultural facilities, and the lack of
city support for these organizations had been documented. The report contained a series
of recommendations that urged a city commitment to the protection, enhancement, and
development of cultural facilities throughout the Boston metropolitan area. 5 5
In 1974 an amendment to the Boston Zoning Code established the Adult Entertainment
District, in effect restricting the Combat Zone to a legal zone along Washington Street in
downtown Boston. This amendment was significant because at the same time as it allowed
adult entertainment uses in this small zone, it prevented their spread to residential
54 Letter from Larry Dicara, President of the Theatre District Association, June 1988.
55 Boston Redevelopment Authority, Cultural and Performing Arts Facility Guidelines
and Recommendations, 1973.
neighborhoods. Today the existence of this legal zone is problematic because these uses
are legally protected. But, because increased development pressure has made them
uneconomic, they are gradually closing down.
In 1978 the City of Boston, in cooperation with area merchants, implemented a
massive public improvements program including a pedestrian mall known as Downtown
Crossing, to create a special ambience and image for the central retail area of downtown.
This program was responsible for upgrading the area as well as leveraging new investment
including the development of Lafayette Place, a mixed use commercial/hotel and parking
facility adjacent to the lower Washington Street area. (Unfortunately, the complex that
was eventually built turns inward with its back against the street, and it accomplished
little in terms of restoring streetlife to lower Washington Street.)
In 1979 the Boston Redevelopment Authority formalized a plan for the Boston Theater
District and also released The Impact of Theatre and Performing Arts on Boston's Economy.
The Theater District Plan culminated a decade of proposals for the lower Washington Street
Area, and a decade in which the Theatre District Association, an organization that began
to serve as a meeting place for those interested in the future of the arts in the area,
emerged.
The Plan defined a Theater District slightly smaller than the current Midtown Cultural
District which would encompass existing and proposed legitimate theaters and other movie
theaters. 5 6 The Impact Report sought to substantiate the importance of revitalization of
the Theater District by emphasizing the contribution of theater to the city's economy.
Although the research document stated that it would "enable the City to begin to form
guidelines to maximize the market potential generated by a reinvigorated theatre district,"
56 Boston Redevelopment Authority, The Theater District Plan, 1979.
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the specific means for achieving this were never discussed.5 7 Again, the emphasis was
more on vision and wishful thinking than on implementation.
In retrospect, it is clear that the proposals of the 1960's and 1970's never came to
fruition for several reasons. Many of the plans remained at the level of broad policy
objectives, without paying attention to a strategy for implementation. Although these
proposals were plans for cultural development, it appears that the arts community itself
was not sufficiently organized nor involved politically. These plans were rarely targeted
towards a specific audience whose behavior they hoped to affect. In the view of some,
City policy continued to direct development to elsewhere in the city, treating Midtown as
the stepchild of the city. But, most importantly, the overall economy for the city was
simply not strong enough during these decades to provide momentum to realize cultural
development that was perceived, at best as marginally profitable.
Into the 1980's
The 1980's marked a transformation in the revitalization potential for the lower
Washington Street area. All of a sudden the high risks associated with development in the
1960's and 1970's were no longer an issue. Ralph Memelo, BRA spokesperson, summarizes
these changes:
In the 60's, the city was seen as the initiator, the provider, the fixer-upper...this
simply has changed, and you now have a city where real estate developers have
indicated they are looking to the area.5 8
A booming Boston real estate market, in conjunction with an intensified level of
commitment by various arts groups, changed the perceptions of both the public sector and
the private sector regarding the potential for cultural development in the area. The
57 Boston Redevelopment Authority, The Impact of Theatre and Performing Arts on
Boston's Economy, 1979.
58 Gendron, "Midtown: New Plan for an Old Problem," The Boston Business Journal,
p. S2.
emphasis began to change, ever so slightly, away from arts-led development to the arts
attaching themselves to the coattails of development, realizing that this was the means to
accomplish arts objectives.
It was the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce that in 1980 convened a series of
meetings with representatives of business, government, and community groups to address
concerns associated with the economic and physical revitalization of the lower Washington
Street area. These discussions led to the formation of the Center City Task Force to
bring together diverse interests in the lower Washington Street area to identify common
concerns and objectives for future land use and development. In 1982 the Center City
Task Force and the City of Boston jointly published Center City: Goals & Guidelines for
Revitalization. The publication became a key step in the rejuvenated effort to revitalize
the area into a vibrant mixed-use community because of the partnership that it
represented.59
In 1983 the BRA with the assistance of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, (SOM) Boston,
prepared Downtown Crossing: An Economic Strategy Plan. The Plan emphasizes the
importance of the hinge block as a site that "provides a prime opportunity for the design
of a landmark building that will visually connect the high-rises of the Back Bay with those
of the Financial District."6 0 It encourages the extension of the pedestrian orientation of
Downtown Crossing to the lower Washington Street area. 6 1 The Plan also presented a far
more detailed development and implementation strategy than any of the previous BRA
planning documents.
59 Interview with Simone Auster, Vice President of Community Development, Greater
Boston Chamber of Commerce, 2/16/88.
60 David Luberoff, A History of Hinge Block Planning.
61 Interview with Simone Auster, 7/88.
The Turning Point
The turning point for the Cultural District initiative was in 1984. In that year the
Performing Arts Development Task Force, a collaborative effort among the Mayor's Office
of Business and Cultural Development, ARTS/Boston (a non-profit organization providing
services to Boston's performing arts organizations, including the sale of reduced price
tickets), the Massachusetts Cultural Alliance, and some 70 performing arts groups was
established. This Task Force conducted a survey of artist's space needs in the Boston
metropolitan area that illustrated a clear cut need for performance, rehearsal and office
space for the arts. The survey estimated a need for nine new performance spaces, all but
one to be less than 500 seats, and called for a comprehensive plan to enhance and support
the city's existing facilities. 6 2
Shortly after this survey came out, Mayor Raymond Flynn established the City of
Boston's Office of Arts and Humanities to fill the need for an independent agency within
the City to do long range planning and advocacy for the arts. Bruce Rossley, the Arts
Administrator for Flynn's Office of Business and Cultural Development at the time of the
1984 Needs Assessment Survey was named commissioner of this new office.
In the fall of 1986, the OAH along with Larry Murray, Executive Director of
ARTS/Boston, and the cultural community began the process of identifying Boston's
potential for addressing the needs identified in the space survey. According to Catherine
Royce, Director of Cultural Industries and Facilities, City of Boston's Office of Arts and
Humanities, "at this point, the needs assessment survey went from a study to a vision."
With key support from the business community, particulary the Greater Boston Chamber of
Commerce at this early stage, and after meeting with local performing arts groups including
primarily dance, theatre and music companies, the Performing Arts Development Task Force
62 Interview with Catherine Royce, Director of Cultural Industries and Facilities,
City of Boston Office of Arts and Humanities, 2/24/88.
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presented a set of recommendations to the BRA. This proactive stance by the arts
community represented a drastic change from any previous level of involvement.
Shortly thereafter, the BRA, along with Bruce Rossley and Larry Murray helped form
a new organization, the Midtown Cultural District Task Force, to provide an organized
voice for the arts to advocate on behalf of the District and to coordinate efforts between
all interested parties. Unlike earlier coalitions, the Midtown Cultural District Task Force
has wide representation from the arts community, as well as developers, retail groups,
financial institutions, and downtown residents. It has come to be important politically,
applying pressure on the City at critical points in the continuing development of the
District. However, it is not incorporated and functions largely on an informal basis with
open committee membership.
With the establishment of the Midtown Cultural District Task Force the momentum to
establish the Cultural District was then transferred to the BRA and OAH who would jointly
exert the authority to formalize and begin to implement the effort by developing specific
proposals for the District. The involvement of the OAH assures that the arts community
can remain proactive in promoting its agenda for the area. The Midtown Cultural District
Task Force continues to be extremely important, however, providing constant feedback on
the BRA's proposals for the District, participating in the design of specific guidelines for
implementation of the District, and keeping external pressure on the City. The Boston
Globe, the major local daily newspaper, has also played an important role by running key
editorials for the establishment of the Midtown Cultural District as a municipal priority.
More recently, the 1987 Space Chase Survey was conducted to assess and update the
1984 analysis of the needs of Boston's performing arts community. This update was
valuable in maintaining the momentum of the entire initiative and refining the results
initiated by the previous space assessment study. 6 3
While most of the recent activity has been in close collaboration with the City, during
the Summer of 1987 a group from the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce's Center City
Task Force independently reconvened to consider the future of this downtown area. The
Chamber's Task Force has been looking at the lower Washington Street area since the early
1980's before the economics turned favorable, but because the area is ripe for significant
new development activity and has the renewed interest of policy makers, their current
efforts are particulary valuable. The Task Force is currently engaged in an analysis to
determine its growth objectives for the area plus the 5 Center City neighborhoods
including: Chinatown, Park Plaza, the Theater District, the Medical/Educational area, and
Downtown Crossing.6 The Task Force recently released a report indicating the hinge
block should be developed as a high-rise complex of offices, housing and cultural space
with up to one million square feet of new development in a 26 to 28 story complex. Such
a proposal differs considerably from the smaller scale development recommended by the
BRA.6 5
Since 1987, the BRA has hired several well-respected consultants to assist them in the
planning for the development of the Midtown Cultural District. Enid Reisser, a Chicago
consultant responsible for that city's 1986 needs assessment study, was brought in to
review and comment on the data provided by the Boston needs assessment surveys for
cultural organizations. Robert Brannigan, a New York theater consultant, was hired to
provide recommendations about the cost of building theaters, and to develop baseline costs
to work form. According to Catherine Royce "his work provides a reality check for the
63 ARTS/Boston, Office of Arts and Humanities, City of Boston and the Boston
Redevelopment Authority, 1987 Boston Space Case Survey, 1988.
64 Interview with Simone Auster, 2/16/88.
65 John King, "Task Force Suggests Uses For Intown Hinge Block," The Boston
Globe, June, 1988.
City." lie has also serves as a consultant to developers on what works in various spaces
for cultural facilities. This is particularly important in that many developers have had
little experience in developing cultural facilities. Benjamin Thompson Associates, a
Cambridge architectural firm, was hired to develop two phases of streetscape guidelines.
This firm was also hired to provide similar urban design and streetscape studies during
earlier planning for this District in the late 1970's. 6 6 The Chicago office of Skidmore,
Owings and Merrill was hired by the BRA to formulate varying development scenarios to
determine whether the BRA's height and massing recommendations for the Midtown Cultural
District Plan seemed appropriate from an urban design perspective. 6 7 And finally, the
Institute of Contemporary Art was hired to provide visual arts consultant services to assist
in developing guidelines for art in public spaces and performance art, as well as to
coordinate visual art events in the District.6 8
Although the BRA has urban design and development analysts on its staff, these
outside consultants were used to provide objective feedback on BRA proposals and specific
expertise in areas where the BRA staff capacity is limited. These consultants report
directly to the BRA and they have not had any contact with one another, so they are
unable to take direct advantage of one another's work. This situation is further
complicated by the lack of a central person within the BRA who is coordinating na and
overseeing all planning efforts for the Cultural District project.
IMPLEMENTATION CONTEXT
At long last the Midtown Cultural District Plan is moving toward implementation. In
large part this is due to the fact that the planning for implementation of this District
66 Interview with Catherine Royce, 2/24/88.
67 Interview with Rita Caviglia, Senior Planner, Boston Redevelopment Authority, 5/88.
68 Interview with David Ross, Director, Institute of Contemporary Art, 3/88.
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differed from previous efforts by the BRA in significant ways. Most important is the
active involvement of the arts community and resident interest groups concerned about the
future of the area. Never before have these groups played such a participatory role in
developing the plans for the area and supporting its realization. Moreover, the current
schemes' boundaries encompass a much larger area than those of previous efforts, enlarging
the constituency that can potentially support the plan (though this enlargement could also
mean more complicated politics between interest groups). And finally, it is happening in
the context of a broader planning process directed at the rezoning the entire city, rather
than limited to planning of individual cultural facilities. This comprehensive plan will
enable the BRA to gradually gain control of development in the area and institutionalize a
framework for growth. With the exception of Dallas Arts District described in Chapter 1,
this comprehensiveness has been noticeably lacking in the approaches of other cities
developing cultural facilities.
Zoning for Culture
The BRA is currently engaged in rezoning significant portions of Boston to replace
the existing regulations of the 1964 Boston Zoning Code that are largely inappropriate for
the current planning context because land uses have changed. To initiate the rezoning
process the BRA identified eleven Special Study Areas in the larger downtown as requiring
new zoning rules. Zoning for one of these areas, the Midtown Cultural District, was
recently released as the primary implementation tool for the Cultural District Plan.
The preliminary zoning proposed for the area focusing on controlling new growth for
Midtown while encouraging cultural facilities, housing and consumer-related facilities. As
currently conceived, most blocks in the District would have a 125 foot height limit with
an FAR of eight. Upon successful compliance with design review the as of right
development level could be increased to 155 feet and a FAR of ten. Developers are eligible
for an increase in FAR by one if they add day care facilities or other public uses to their
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Three zones of the District, called Planned Development Areas (PDAs), allow
development up to 400 feet: the Essex Street Corridor, running from Summer Street to the
Commonwealth Center project; Tremont Street south of Stuart Street; and three blocks on
upper Washington Street near Woolworth's.69 Specific height limits within the PDAs vary
from block to block ranging from 235 feet along Stuart Street to 375 feet along
Washington Street for the Commonwealth Center project (Exhibit 2-2). To qualify for
additional height and bulk beyond the base level in PDAs, developers must provide public
amenity in the form of cultural facilities or affordable housing on a four to one formula
related to value. 7 0 Any major development within the Cultural District is required to
include a theater. Design standards in the proposed zoning encourage glass facades and
wedding cake style setbacks after 90 foot heights. Specifics of the new zoning are
expected to be worked out through a citizen participation process between the BRA & OAH
staff and concerned community and business groups.
The steps leading up to the proposed zoning were prolonged because of the mandate
for a community-based rezoning process outlined in the downtown IPOD. The BRA and the
OAI have met and continue to meet with concerned interest groups in the area to resolve
block by block differences. (When the BRA prepares a draft plan it sets up a series of
public meetings to brief interest groups about its major components. A public comment
period follows and suggestion can be made for possible inclusion in the Plan. This process
is repeated several times until adequate detailing and refinement is achieved. The BRA has
69 John King, "Washington Street Puzzle Still in Pieces," The Boston Globe, June 27,
1988.
70 According to Section 38-7(6) of the Draft Midtown Cultural District Plan Zoning
Code, the value of the amount (of bonus commercial] floor area ... for construction or
rehabilitation of an on-site theater or other Cultural Facility is equal to four (4) times the
average cost per square foot of providing new or rehabilitated theater or other Cultural
Facility space."
to balance the priorities of different parties in proposed new zoning as well as resolve any
conflicts satisfactorily.)
While details of the new zoning are being worked out, a set of interim or transitional
zoning regulations have been imposed to protect Boston's downtown from inconsistent
development. These regulations, formally referred to as the Downtown Interim Planning
Overlay District or Downtown IPOD, establish a 155 foot height limit for new development
effective two years beginning in September 1987. By the end of the period, new
permanent zoning for the city is expected to be in place. Alex Twining expresses concern
with these temporary standards because:
The establishment of this interim zoning policy has served to confuse matters
entirely. The general public thinks this temporary zoning is permanent.. .so, as
development beyond the IPOD's height limit is proposed they will oppose it,
incorrectly thinking it violates the zoning code. 7 '
Yet, the rewriting of the overall Zoning Code has opened a window of opportunity for
regulatory mechanisms to be specifically tailored to encourage Cultural District objectives
that has not been available before nor will it be available again for some time.
The Midtown Cultural District has been selected by the BRA as the first of the eleven
Special Study Areas to be rezoned for two reasons. First, the area is the last remaining
portion of central Boston that still has a substantial capacity to accommodate new growth
and as a result is the focal point for a diversity of development interests. The BRA is
therefore under pressure to gain control over envisaged new growth, rather than letting
speculative activity take the reins from its hands, perhaps displacing some of the remaining
cultural uses in the process. Second, the area is potentially the most complex of the
Special Study Areas to organize through new zoning due to the presence of a wide range
of intermixed land uses and great variation in the physical fabric. Given the limited two
year time period of the protective umbrella of the Downtown IPOD, it was imperative for
71 Interview with Alex Twining, 7/22/88.
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the BRA to activate the rezoning process immediately.
The Current Plan
Simultaneous with the release of preliminary zoning regulations for the District, in
July of 1988 the BRA and the OAH released a proposed Midtown Cultural District Plan.
The draft Plan establishes planning objectives for the future of the area and presents a
conceptual urban design vision. This document along with the proposed zoning code is
intended to initiate and focus the public debate to gradually work out the specifics of
public intervention to guide growth to establish the District.
The main components of the Plan show how cultural priorities for the area have been
intertwined with physical and economic growth objectives. In defining the boundaries of
the Midtown Cultural District the BRA has established two sets of edges. The first
outlines the Midtown area. The second, included within the larger Midtown area, outlines
the Cultural District itself. While the latter includes the theatres, the boundaries of the
former stretch out on either side of the Cultural District to include the retail activity of
Downtown Crossing, the Park Plaza area including a hotel and a proposed mixed-use
development project, and the Bedford-Essex Streets corridor. The latter is the site for a
proposed office tower and overlaps with a portion of the South Station designated by the
City for future economic development. The simultaneous use of these boundaries recognizes
cultural development as being dependent on economic revitalization objectives of the
District.
The stated planning objectives of the Plan take into consideration cultural as well as
commercial and residential land uses. Apart from the renovation and creation of cultural
facilities for the performing and visual arts, the Plan also mandates the preservation of
historic buildings, the creation and maintenance of public open space, the building of
mixed-income housing, the establishment of neighborhood business opportunities, the
inclusion of on-site day care facilities, the improvement of transportation access, the siting
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of mixed-use and office buildings on environmentally sound sites, and the funding of
affordable housing in neighboring Chinatown. While the Plan does not directly refer to the
Combat Zone, it is apparent that underlying this Plan is the assumption that market forces
will gradually make these adult entertainment uses uneconomical. 7 2
In terms of cultural facilities, the Plan calls for the creation of an additional ten
small and medium sized performance spaces as well as eight art galleries and several
museums.7 3 Like the existing exhibition and performance spaces in the State
Transportation Building, most of the new facilities are expected to be integrated into
mixed-use buildings proposed for the area, rather than being separate entities. Bruce
Rossley comments:
The idea of arts being a part of mixed-use areas isn't new. Developers may
grumble, but they know this isn't philanthropy--it is enlightened self-interest
that makes their projects more attractive.74
Nevertheless both developers and the downtown business sector question whether the
demand for this number of cultural facilities will actually materialize and whether the
proposed locations are the most appropriate for cultural activities.
The hinge block, located at the center of the District, is now proposed as a
residential complex and the venue for a cluster of visual-arts facilities with a public open
space core, quite different from the mega-structure plans of the 1960's and the more
recent recommendation by the Center City Task Force. The BRA urban design vision also
includes a network of pedestrian oriented streets and public spaces lined with restaurants,
nightclubs and shops to provide the support critical to create a lively 18-hour environment
for the area. These theatre boulevards and alleys, located strategically to
72 Boston Redevelopment Authority, Draft Midtown Cultural District Plan, July 1988.
73 Original nine theatres called for in the 1984 survey has been increased to ten in
the Plan.
74 John King, "City Puts Culture At Center," The Boston Globe, 1988.
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build on existing relationships between theatres and street patterns. 7 5 Additionally, there
are seven National Register District within the Midtown Cultural District that include a
number of significant historic buildings, many of them theaters (Appendix Exhibit 2-1).76
As of this writing, the BRA and the OAH are converting this vision into a final set
of specific zoning regulations to coincide with the release of the final Plan.
Progress in the implementation process has been unexpectedly complicated. The BRA staff
has been finding it increasingly difficult to transform planning objectives and conceptual
urban design schemes into definite zoning rules. Prior to the July 14th release of draft
zoning regulations and the District Plan, Bethany Kendall, Executive Vice President of
Downtown Crossing Association, commented:
To date, project managers at the BRA have had limited in-depth involvement,
they paint pretty pictures with a general sweep, however, they have not gotten
nitty gritty enough.7 7
The release of these preliminary steps is a positive step toward achieving the District
objectives, but final documents are still not expected for months. The impact of the
continuing delay is that the economic climate may become less vibrant, and as a result,
developers may be less able to support the BRA's requirements of contribution toward
cultural facilities.
75 Boston Redevelopment Authority, Draft Midtown Cultural District Plan, 1988.
76 The listing of qualified districts on the National Register of Historic Places,
compiled by the U.S. Department of the Interior, identifies these properties and makes it
possible for the owners to take advantage of certain tax incentives, but it does not place
any constraint on future alteration or renovation of the structures. The Boston Landmarks
Commission, however, has identified specific properties within the District that are
historically significant and City policy encourages their protection from demolition or
adverse demolition. Depending on their level of historic significance, specific buildings may
be fully protected from demolition and must have systematic design review before being
altered.
77 Interview with Bethany Kendall, Executive Vice President Downtown Crossing
Association, 3/18/88.
The District Trust
A key component toward achieving the Midtown Cultural District Plan is the proposed
Cultural District Trust, a non-profit institution that would be responsible for managing,
programming, promoting, and maintaining new cultural facilities and public spaces in the
District. This organization would be given the critical role of coordinating fundraising
efforts for non-profit cultural facilities and activities in the District. Eventually it may
get involved in leasing, developing and possibly acquiring cultural facilities.
While details about the membership and form of the Trust are still being worked out,
the BRA, the OAI, and the Midtown Cultural District Task Force are convinced that the
successful implementation of the District depends on the Trust. Catherine Royce expects
the Board of the Trust will consist of an ex-officio representation from both the City and
the State, "but it would not be controlled by either."7 8 In addition it would have a strong
advisory committee composed of professional artists and staff.
The Trust would have access to several sources of funds from both the public and
private sectors. These include funds from the sale of public lands; funds from special
assessments on new development; contributions made by developers for maintenance and
facility renovation; federal, state or local grants; private individual, corporate or foundation
support; fundraising events; and earned income. (As a non-profit organization the Trust
would qualify for grants that otherwise would be unavailable to developers.) The Plan calls
for developers who take advantage of the zoning incentive and provide a cultural facility
within their development to lease the facility to the Trust for a nominal sum of I dollar
per year for 99 years. The Trust, in turn, would collect revenues from arts groups who
use these facilities.
78 Interview with Catherine Royce, 2/24/88.
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DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT
The Boston real estate market has undergone a tremendous boom during the 1980's
and is largely responsible for the renewed optimism for redevelopment of the Midtown
Cultural District area. As Libbie Shufro states:
We could have presented these ideas a decade ago and no doors would have
opened. Its an idea whose time has come because Boston is on a growth
cycle. 79
During the last several years, rising property values and changing attitudes have forced
many of the adult entertainment businesses in the Combat Zone to close up or move to less
central locations. Buildings in the Midtown area are beginning to be restored and the
number of vacant structures has declined. Yet, despite the availability of inexpensive
office space in the Midtown area and the tremendous crunch for space in the Financial
District and the Back Bay, the pace of change and development in the area has been
relatively slow.
Those familiar with the Midtown development context cite several reasons for the
slow pace of development in the area. Even though the Combat Zone is noticeably
shrinking, development suffers from the negative image of this area. Bethany Kendall
states:
We can't ignore the fact that the Combat Zone is in close proximity. I think
that certainly has a negative effect on growth.8 0
The large commercial projects that may be necessary to change public perception are
particularly difficult to put together because of the pattern of land ownership in the area
makes land assemblage for development particularly difficult. Some of the blocks in the
District are populated by up to a dozen tenants in two to seven story buildings which are
79 Marie Gendron, "Midtown: New Plan for an Old Problem,"The Boston Business
Journal, February 23, 1987, p. S3.
80 Marie Gendron, "Midtown: New Plan for an Old Problem,"The Boston Business
Journal, p. S3.
generally individually owned. Therefore, for a developer to gain control of the entire
block, s/he must buy out long term leases and pay to relocate tenants. Moreover, land is
very expensive, costing from 200 to 400 dollars per square foot.
In the view of some, the designation of numerous structures as architecturally
significant hinders development potential in the area because such designation prevents
demolition of certain of these properties and influences how construction on surrounding
structures can be conducted. But to other, this protection is appropriate, forcing new
development to respect the value of these structures.
The neighboring Chinatown community comprises a politically powerful interest group
that has significant influence in delaying development of the Midtown Cultural District.
The Chinese community supports the elimination of the Combat Zone, but it opposes future
large scale development that is inconsistent with their own neighborhood objectives.
Additionally, neighborhood residents are interested in establishing a district-to-district
benefit program to aid the Chinatown community, including the creation of low-income
housing, small scale business opportunities and job training. The current Cultural District
Plan proposes developers contribute to the existing linkage fund for low income housing,
job training for Chinatown residents and the promotion of cultural facilities.
Developers are concerned that although they view this area as an underutilized
resource, and therefore ultimately anticipate great returns, it still has a long way to go
before becoming a Cultural District reality. Therefore, the combination of these up front
costs may turn out to be too exorbitant an exaction given the short-term potential for
economic return.
Despite these barriers to the District's development, Bruce Rossley, the arts
commissioner for the City of Boston Office of Arts and Humanities summarizes the Midtown
Cultural District Plan as follows:
What we're talking about is one of the largest projects of its kind in the nation,
and very likely a model for cultural development projects in the 80's and 90's in
53
the way Faneuil Hall Market place was for urban retail-center development in
the 70's.8 1
Specific issues regarding financing, organization, operation, and management of the District
that have not been worked out will be highlighted in the next chapter.
81 Jeff McLaughlin, "BRA Plans Development of Downtown Cultural District," The
Boston Globe, October 31, 1986, pp. 1 & 17.
CHAPTER 3
ASSESSMENT OF THE CULTURAL DISTRICT INITIATIVE
As of this writing, all interested parties are carefully studying the proposed Plan and
proposed zoning regulations. Because formal efforts of establishing the Midtown Cultural
District are in midstream it is not possible to evaluate the result. However, it is
instructive to highlight the issues that have been raised in the process thus far. These
issues are discussed from the perspective of the major interests groups involved with the
initiative.
CITY ISSUES
For the most part, issues which are of concern to the City revolve around the role of
the public sector in determining trade-offs among the combined objectives of economic
growth, cultural activity and other social purposes.
Economic Growth:
How does the City strike a balance between maintaining enough regulatory control on
new development to satisfy important public purposes and allowing developers enough
latitude to ensure the commercial success of proposed projects? In this case, the tradeoff
has been manifested in allowing enhanced heights in exchange for contributions for cultural
facilities and other social purposes.
To what extent is the City willing to invest public monies to promote the physical
construction of cultural facilities? Depending on how well incentive zoning works, the City
may need to make capital investments of its own to make investment by the private sector
more attractive.
Urban design objectives like the creation of public space and the protection of
historic buildings provide constraints on the efficient use of land from the point of view of
the private sector and the loss of potential property taxes from the point of view of the
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public sector. On what criteria does the City decide the appropriate mix of land uses that
would ensure good urban design as well as provide adequate economic returns for the City?
This becomes increasingly complicated in the case of Boston where guidelines would need to
be strictly enforced on private property as very little of the land in the District is owned
by the City.
How long can the City wait for market forces to push out adult entertainment uses
without using legal action? This is a complicated situation because the City would
undoubtedly be sued for the restriction of First Amendment rights to free expression.
Cultural Activity:
How will the City provide subsidies for smaller and upcoming arts groups who may be
priced out of the proposed cultural facilities? While the City maintains that the current
proposals do not amount to cultural welfare, if struggling arts groups are excluded, the
purpose of establishing the District will not be served. To what extent should public
control be exercised to ensure an equitable distribution in the use of the cultural facilities?
What will the long run costs be in required subsidy, and what portion will the City find
itself picking up?
Social Objectives:
How will the City handle the trade-off between incentives for affordable housing,
neighborhood business uses and cultural facilities? The first two are necessary because of
the lack of affordable housing and business expansion opportunities in Chinatown, yet the
latter is an explicit priority of the District Plan.
Finally, at what point will the City be ready to move beyond planning and proposals
to implementation? While the City is committed to involving the public, such consensus
building becomes complicated and drawn out causing delays in implementation that may
prove costly for the development of the District.
DOWNTOWN BUSINESS ISSUES
Bethany Kendall, representing downtown business interests, states any development in
the district would increase competition and therefore be a positive step in making it
economically more viable. But, she raises several issues pertaining to timing, development
certainty and public safety:
Timing-
Should development be ensured for the immediate future even at the cost of fewer
cultural facilities now rather than more later? Delays through restrictions on development
would hurt developers and cut short the momentum required to establish the District.
Development Certainty:
How will the BRA ensure fair warning to eliminate surprises that might produce
conflicts as the Plan moves to implementation?
Will the BRA avoid a project-by-project negotiation based process? This must be
avoided if the City wishes to facilitate the relocation of business into the area. It is
critical that the City propose a clear cut vision for the future of the District at the very
onset.
How will the Downtown Crossing area be physically linked to the Midtown Cultural
District?
Public Safety:
How will the public sector address the issues of filth and safety in the area? In the
view of the business community, these factors have been the major cause of the decline of
business and affect the ability of the area to develop.
ARTS ISSUES
The critical issues for the arts community are establishing that the demand for new
facilities exists and that they will actually be used and resolving the future administration
and management of facilities.
Physical Facilities:
How realistic is the proposed need for ten new cultural facilities and how are they
matched to the performance needs of each performing arts group? What would the
implications be if the facilities are underutilized?
How great a priority is space in the Midtown Cultural District to artists, or would
their needs be more appropriately satisfied by a greater number of facilities spread around
the city, perhaps in less competitive and less expensive areas?
Ultimately, how important is name recognition of a permanent home for individual
performers for the success of these cultural groups (current plan proposes shared facilities
by different groups)?
Organization/Management:
Who will actually be responsible for the development of the cultural facilities and how
will issues of quality and compatibility with artists needs be addressed?
How will programming of the cultural facilities be administered? What control will
the artists be able to maintain in this process?
How will the competition for space between smaller, emerging performing arts groups
and more established companies be addressed?
Who will be responsible for the management of the Cultural District Trust?
DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
In Boston's Midtown where blight characterizes select portions of the District, the
feasibility of cultural development projects is a major issue. Developer concerns are
divided into issues of economics, management and process.
Economics:
Are developers being asked to bear an unfair proportion of the burden for public
benefit? Or, worded another way, will there be adequate public incentive to attract them
to participate in the upgrading of this blighted area? Only with the recently proposed
zoning incentives, can developers begin to estimate the expected economic return under
different economic scenarios.
Is it possible for the negative public perception associated with the Combat Zone to
be changed without the approval of large scale development projects to establish a critical
mass of revitalization?
Management:
How will management of the cultural facilities be administered? As developers, they
are not interested in getting involved in the business of arts management; yet, given that
these facilities are located within their buildings, they must be sensitive to how such
activities could influence their business reputation; therefore, they feel they must exert
some management control.
Process:
What is the time frame for reaching consensus between the interests groups associated
with development of the District; the City, the arts groups, the business community,
historic preservationists and environmentalists? Delay is costly.
These points illustrate the complexity of issues for development of the Cultural
District. Although they are based on the Midtown Cultural District example, they are not
limited to the Boston context. Many of the cultural development examples reviewed in
Chapter 1 illustrated similar experiences. The next chapter addresses potential forms of
public intervention encouraging redevelopment of the Cultural District.
CHAPTER 4
PUBLIC SECTOR FORMS OF INTERVENTION
Once the broad outline for the Plan of the District becomes acceptable,
implementation will take the form of a series of choices among potential tools available to
the City. Although preliminary regulations for the District illustrate primarily a zoning
intervention, it is important to understand the entire range of tools from which the public
sector might choose. For purposes of discussion these alternatives are divided according to
land use or financial techniques.
LAND-USE TECHNIQUES
The land use techniques which are financially based, but location specific, for public
sector intervention include: establishment of a Special Development District, Incentive
Zoning, Air Rights, Transfer of Development Rights, Eminent Domain, and Public Land.
Special Development District
A Special Development District or Planned Zoning District contains predetermined
design and amenity requirements, and sometimes architectural requirements that are
identified in the zoning ordinance. The ordinance may also specify a specific mix of uses,
mandatory and elective bonus and non-bonus features, off-site improvements, or
contributions to public improvements. These districts may be established to provide for
procedural mechanisms to assure development is consistent with the character of district
objectives and to minimize the potential for administrative delay. Special Districts may or
may not have taxing power, but they do have the power to levy charges for services
provided by the District. 8 2 A detailed comprehensive plan for development is necessary to
82 Arthur Gitajn, Creating and Financing Public Enterprise, (Government Finance
Research Center of the Government Finance officers Association, Washington, D.C., 1984),
p. 102.
Potential Site for the ICA
define the District. The Special Development District concept underlies the new zoning for
the Boston Midtown Cultural District Special Study Area.
Incentive Zoning
Incentive Zoning allows more height and density than is otherwise accepted under the
zoning code in exchange for the provision of certain public benefits. As described in
Chapter 2, the current Midtown zoning proposal is based on a 4 to I formula pertaining to
cost of bonus commercial square feet to cultural facility. In large part this technique is
the essential element in creating the Midtown District.
Air Rights
The purchase or lease of air rights over buildings, that are below the limit allowed
by the zoning code could be used to increase the development potential of new projects in
the District. Under this scenario a developer of an adjacent parcel could purchase and use
the excess air rights over an underutilized adjacent historic building. This technique is
currently being considered for a empty lot next to the 2-story Wilbur Theater which has
tentatively been discussed as the new home for the Institute of Contemporary Art. Such a
proposal would involve the utilization of air rights over the Theater currently owned by
the New England Medical Center. Rents from the commercial space of this development
could possibly be diverted to provide financial aid to the financially troubled theater.
Unless parcels are owned by the same landholder, it is unlikely that similar development
partnerships such as this one would be initiated elsewhere in the District.
Transfer of Development Rights
These rights differ from the concept of the purchase or lease of air rights, in that
the authorized but unbuilt development rights are allowed to be severed from the existing
land use and therefore are transferable to another nearby, but not necessarily adjacent,
location for development. Such a scheme could induce further flexibility in mixing cultural
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with economic priorities and prevent the tearing down of historic buildings. Although
originally considered a possible strategy for the Cultural District, transfer development
rights are not being considered because of the frequency of successful legal challenge in
other cities.
Eminent Domain
It is possible eminent domain, whereby the government can force the purchase of
private property for public goals, would be used to enable the City to purchase facade
easements of significant historic buildings. This mechanism in essence separates the facade
from the rest of the building, for preservation and maintenance by the public sector. In
order to pay for the purchase of the facade easements and for their renovation, the City
could generate revenues by zoning the area as a Betterment or Special Assessment District
and levy district-wide assessments for public expenditures. In this case it is expected that
the wider boundaries of the Midtown District would comprise the assessment area, with the
monies raised channeled into the Cultural District. Such a scheme could be particularly
important for the Liberty Tree Building which dates back to 1777 and the Hayden Building,
a significant H.H. Richardson building; both of which are in extreme disrepair.
Public Land
The contribution or sale at a reduced price of public land is another potential
technique for the BRA to assist in lowering the private sector cost for development of the
Midtown Cultural District. Although the BRA does not own any of the larger development
sites, the agency could play a role with the smaller parcels. The City does own strategic
land parcels located in the interior of the hinge block, which could be critical to land
assemblage and successful development of the block.
FINANCIAL TECHNIQUES
The public sector fimancial techniques to assist in the District's development include:
a betterment/special assessment district, linkage payments, grants, loans, operating
subsidies, or other special property incentives.
Betterment/Special Assessment District
A Betterment District is a combined financial and design tool that permits a city
within a certain designated area to assess properties for improvements in the district.
Additional tax revenues as a result of the assessment are focused into specific
improvements that directly benefit the assessed properties. Such a technique allows
complete control by the public agency in the execution of the public improvements.8 3
Originally these districts were used to finance sidewalks, and later water and sewer
projects. In the case of Boston, district wide assessments would be levied to finance the
cost of facade improvements of the historic structures as mentioned in the Eminent Domain
section.
Linkage
Linkage requires developers of large scale projects to make financial contributions to
the City to provide funds for mitigation of the impacts of large-scale commercial
development. Boston requires all developers of buildings over 100,000 square feet to pay 5
dollars per square foot for housing and 1 dollar per square foot for job training linkage.
In the case of the Cultural District, these fees would be exacted in addition to the
required cultural facilities for development above as of right conditions. Relief from such
financial obligations in terms of timing or amount could significantly lower development
costs freeing up capital to subsidize other public amenities which might not otherwise
83 Robert S. Cook, Jr., Zoning for Downtown Design, (Lexington Books, Lexington,
MA, 1980), p. 27.
occur.
Urban Development Action Grant
The Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) is a federally funded program based on
leveraging private sector investment through the provision of public funds for development
in economically distressed areas. Funding is available from the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) as an outright grant or as a long-term, low-interest loan
depending on each city's decision. Unlike other potential public funding programs, UDAG
funds are available on a competitive basis from the federal government to improve the
feasibility of otherwise marginal private sector projects. Because UDAG funding is aimed
at stimulating investment that would not otherwise occur, it is not likely that the Midtown
Cultural District would be eligible for this form of assistance.
Community Development Action Grant
The Community Development Action Grant (CDAG) program is a State program
designed to stimulate economic development activities that will attract private investment.
Funding is available from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of
Communities and Development (EOCD). Like the UDAG program, CDAG is specifically for
the revitalization of distressed areas and is only available in support of those private
investments that would not occur without the State funding. Therefore as with UDAG
funding, it is unlikely the Cultural District would benefit from CDAG funding.
Revenue Bond Financing
Both the Massachusetts Industrial Finance Association (MIFA) and the Health
Educational Facilities Association (HEFA) are sources of tax-exempt bond financing for
non-profit institutions in the Midtown District. Under these programs loans are available
for financing the acquisition of land, construction, or renovation of buildings, land or
equipment purchases or refinancing. Since the 1986 Tax Act, however, major restrictions
have been imposed on private purpose bond funding and funding through bond issues is
more likely to be taxable.
Tax-Increment Financing
Under this technique, the incremental increase of property tax revenues from new
development is used to help fmance the public investment required to create development.
A special tax-increment district is established by the acceptance of a plan for development
or redevelopment of the area. Prior to passage of a redevelopment plan, an assessment
base is determined for properties within the designated district based on the most recent
assessment valuation. During normal city-wide assessments, the district is reassessed and
capital projects are financed by the revenues generated from the incremental increase
between the original base assessment and the new value. 8 4 The municipality sells bonds
to pay for public investments, based on the estimated amount of the potential tax-
increment.
Originally, tax-increment fmancing was used to provide matching funds for federally
funded urban renewal and redevelopment projects. However, in recent years with the
elimination of categorical federal programs, it has become an increasingly common means
for financing redevelopment. In 1984, 38 states not including Massachusetts, had enacted
legislation enabling them to issue bonds for tax-increment fmancing districts. 8 5 Although
tax-increment financing is a popular technique for funding redevelopment of deteriorated
urban centers, in Boston it would require enabling legislation by the Massachusetts
legislature and this appears unlikely.
84 Gitajn, Creating and Financing Public Enterprise, p. 108.
85 Gitajn, Creating and Financing Public Enterprise, p. 112.
Property Tax Abatements
Property tax abatements to reduce or waive property tax payments can substantially
assist the operating situation of a financially strained project. Because such a provision
means an increase in the net operating income, it also increases the loan amount for which
the project is eligible. However, this form of public sector assistance is unlikely in
Boston, which is 80 percent dependent on its tax revenues from property taxes (and 55
percent of its property is tax-exempt). 8 6 Additionally, the need for State authorization
due to the lack of home rule makes this technique less of a possibility.
Federal Income Tax Credits
Federal Income Tax Credits for historic rehabilitation expenses are available to a
limited extent for historic structures in the District. The 1986 tax law modified the tax
credit percentage, the depreciable life, and the kinds and amounts of income against which
the credit, depreciation and other real-estate-related losses can be used, significantly
reducing the previous incentives stimulating historic rehabilitation investment. 8 7
Although each of these mechanisms was originally looked favorably upon to assist in
the development of the District, with closer scrutiny few of them will have any measurable
affect. Either eligibility requirements for funding programs have changed or the specific
circumstances of the Midtown area make the potential for application of these tools
limited. Simone Auster, Vice President of Community Development, Greater Boston
Chamber of Commerce, comments on the importance of City intervention for the
development of the District:
Developers simply can't afford to bear the cost of social, economic, and political
objectives and the city must recognize this before anything positive will occur in
86 Interview with Catherine Royce, 7/22/88.
87 William J. Higgins and Anne B. Covell, "Historic Rehabilitation and The Tax
Reform Act of 1986," in The Real Estate Finance Journal, (Summer 1987), p. 46.
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the District.8 8
Of equal significance is the issue of timing. As mentioned earlier, Boston is currently
enjoying a booming economy with significant private sector investment in the physical
development of the city. To a large extent, the creation of cultural facilities through new
development is dependent on the continuation of this economic trend. If the final rezoning
process is delayed or if project approval is made complicated, new construction could be
extended to a time period where a arts/business symbiosis would no longer be viable. Alex
Twining, comments:
The City of Boston has a unique opportunity in that the City owns a relatively
limited amount of land and therefore, they can have the private sector take the
lead to provide a catalyst for development of the District.8 9
If the BRA does not act quickly to establish the means for public sector involvement and
anchor projects in the area, however, the District's future may be jeopardized.
88 The Boston Globe, 1988.
89 Interview with Alex Twining, 4/6/88.
PART II
CHAPTER 5
THE MODEL FOR ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVE ZONING
INTRODUCTION
Incentive zoning allows additional development beyond the limit otherwise stipulated
by the zoning code in exchange for other concessions from the developer. David Barrett,
consultant to the BRA in the 1970's, states:
[incentive zoning] functions in relation to the central fact of urban real estate
development: that property values are directly related to the intensity of use
permitted. In general, the higher the intensity allowed, the higher the value of
the land itself, and assuming development to the maximum, the greater the value
of any building developed on it.9 0
In taking advantage of the bonus, the developer must provide certain public improvements
or amenities or agree to develop in designated locations, providing public benefits in return
for additional building density. The decision to grant additional height and density has
traditional been justified on the basis of obtaining public amenities or development in
marginally profitable areas that would not otherwise occur.
Incentive zoning is not a new topic for the City of Boston. It is only recently with
the proposal for the Midtown Cultural District that this technique has been debated
formally, but there are many precedents for providing increased development above the
outdated 1964 Zoning Code. Nonetheless, the effects of incentive zoning have never been
evaluated from both the perspective of the city and the private developer in Boston.
Because of the difficulty of comparing quantitative benefits with qualitative impacts, the
marginal benefits of incentive zoning are typically assumed to outweigh the marginal costs.
90 David R. Barrett, Incentive Zoning for Boston, A Report to the Boston
Redevelopment Authority, July, 1973.
For example, the benefits of increased tax and linkage revenues for the City and higher
returns for developers cannot be objectively compared with the qualitative impacts of
additional public amenity, increased congestion and deteriorating air quality. Similarly, the
BRA has assumed formalized incentive zoning will produce net benefit and has chosen it as
the primary tool to facilitate development of cultural facilities in the Midtown Cultural
District.
SCOPE OF ANALYSIS
When beginning this analysis, I sought to evaluate the impacts of incentive zoning for
development of the Midtown Cultural District in Boston. Many individuals argued that
formalized incentive zoning above the IPOD's as of right FAR of 10 and the height limit of
155 feet was necessary to accomplish development of the District. However, there had
been no financial analysis to substantiate if enhanced height at designated locations could
leverage the development or renovation of cultural facilities. As my analysis progressed, I
questioned the ability of incentive zoning as an independent policy tool.
The following discussion presents an analytical framework for evaluating the capacity
of incentive zoning to finance the development of cultural facilities consistent with
Midtown urban design objectives. The model is based on the approach illustrated by Jerold
Kayden in Incentive Zoning in New York City: A Cost-Benefit Analysis. Similar to
Kayden's research, a cost-benefit framework is used, but it is structured to include
elements of financial, fiscal and social analysis. Also consistent to Kayden's analysis, the
discussion disaggregates the impacts of incentive zoning by interest group--the private
developer, the city, and the community.
The identification of impacts for each group is in conflict with the traditional notion
of a cost-benefit framework, which seeks to maximize the net benefit for society as a
whole. However, in the case of an evaluation of incentive zoning, where financial and
political implications vary, it is particularly important to identify them. Kayden states:
Since incentive zoning has different impacts and meanings for each of these
individual groups, however, it is criticalfor the analyst and policy-maker to
understand exactly which costs and which benefits are borne by each segment.9 1
MODEL FOR FINANCIAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
A static financial model is used to measure the returns for different incentive zoning
development scenarios. Although most cost-benefit analyses span over a project's duration,
in this case it is only for one year--between construction completion and stabilized project
operation. With the exception of the developer analysis, long term consequences of
incentive zoning are not evaluated because the impacts for an individual project would be
identical to those in the stabilized year. For the developer, however, operating
assumptions over a 10-year period are modeled to obtain a long term fmancial rate of
return.
Measures of Return
Return estimates for development feasibility exclusive of financing considerations and
land costs are calculated for each incentive zoning scenario. Annual returns are estimated
according to the Return on Total Assets (ROTA) at the stabilized year of operation, before
linkage payments are made. Long-term project returns, measured by the Internal Rate of
Return (IRR), are also calculated before linkage. Because linkage is a short-term exaction
and this analysis assumes it may only be applied on a discretionary basis in the Midtown
Cultural District, calculation of returns before linkage is more representative of project
viability. Land costs, linkage payments or operating subsidy for non-profit cultural
facilities, may offset the estimated return.
91 Jerold S. Kayden, Incentive Zoning in New York City: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, p.
17.
Development Assumptions
Instead of constructing a cost-benefit analysis for the entire Midtown Cultural
District, two representative land parcels are separately analyzed for development. The
first, a 40,000-square-foot site, is a relatively large parcel in relation to those located
within the Midtown Cultural District boundaries. 9 2 The second, a 10,000-square-foot site,
is comparable in size to smaller parcels in the District. 9 3 For each site, a hypothetical
mixed-use project with ground floor retail and office and an enhanced FAR for any cultural
facilities is assumed. Four specific development scenarios evaluate the consequences of
additional FAR within the urban design objectives identified by BRA planning documents.
The proposed zoning for Planned Development Areas (PDAs) in the District is the
basis for different development scenarios. There are four different scenarios assumed: As
of Right at a FAR of 8, FAR 10, FAR 12, and FAR of 14. The As of Right level of
development is limited to 125 feet, does not include any cultural facility and forms the
base of comparison for my evaluation. Beyond the As of Right height and density, the
proposed zoning states projects must mitigate the impacts of "increased land values" by
constructing an on-site cultural facility, rehabilitating historic buildings, or constructing
on-site housing in a ratio of four to one in relation to value. 9 4 Scenario 1 with an FAR
of 10, Scenario 2 with an FAR of 12 and Scenario 3 with an FAR of 14 each include
cultural facilities at a cost equal to 25 percent of the value of the additional square feet
92 Boston Redevelopment Authority, Draft Midtown Cultural District Plan--Zoning
Regulation, July 1988, Appendix A.
93 Singularly owned land parcels in the Midtown Cultural District range from 1,000
square feet to 3.3 acres (143,748 square feet).
94 Boston Redevelopment Authority, Draft Midtown Cultural District Plan--Zoning
Regulation, 1988, pp. 4-5.
EXHIBIT 5-1
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
SUMMARY OF PROGRAM ASSUMPTIONS, HYPOTHETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 40,000 SF PARCEL, EXISTING MARKET CONDITIONS
As of Right Scenario*: Scenario 1:
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gaf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
20,000
17,800
300,000
285,000
320,000
302,800
Scenario 2:
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
20,000
17,800
460,000
437,000
32,243
25,794
512,243
480,594
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross CulturaL gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gaf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
Scenario 3:
FAR
RETAIL
Gross RetaiL gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
= am = = === == = =
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
20,000
17,800
380,000
361,000
16,121
12,897
416,121
391,697
20,000
17,800
540,000
513,000
48,634
38,907
608,634
569,707
of development built above as of right levels. 9 5 None of these scenarios would exceed the
absolute 400 foot height limit proposed by the new zoning for the District. Base
programming assumptions for current market conditions are illustrated in Exhibits 5-1 and
5-2.96
The development costs assumptions, illustrated in Exhibit 5-3, are current costs for
mixed-use development projects. Although size and character of actual developments might
influence development costs, this analysis keeps these variables constant between different
development scenarios. Parking costs are not included in the analysis because the zoning
plan does not require off street parking for any commercial project in the District.
Assuming that the City owns both parcels of land and the purchase price would be
negotiated, land was treated as a residual in this analysis. 9 7
Given that a cultural district includes different types of cultural facilities such as
dance theaters, jazz clubs, rehearsal spaces, experimental theaters, office space, and
outdoor performance space, it is important to evaluate the ability of incentive zoning to
subsidize various types of cultural facilities. Furthermore, because the value of incentive
zoning is based on land area, different parcels are able to provide varying sizes of cultural
facilities. Therefore, the 40,000-square-foot parcel is used to analyze the feasibility of
providing a major cultural facility such as a dance theater, concert hall or art gallery,
95 This analysis assumes "value" referred to in the Zoning Code is defined as total
development costs, however, other interpretations may include hard costs of construction or
the capitalized value of the rental income of bonus square feet of office space
development. Based on this definition, the square feet of required cultural facility is
calculated as follows: ((Gross Building Area of Commercial Area of Bonus Scenario - Gross
Building Area of As of Right Scenario) x Average Development Cost of As of Right
Scenario +4 4 Average Development Cost of Cultural Facility).
96 For programming assumptions for Weak Local Market conditions and Strong Local
Market conditions due to the formula to calculate cultural square feet see Appendix
Exhibits 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4.
97 Land costs in the Midtown area range from 200 to 400 dollars per square foot.
EXHIBIT 5-2
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
SUMMARY OF PROGRAM ASSUMPTIONS, HYPOTHETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 10,000 SF PARCEL, EXISTING MARKET CONDITIONS
As of Right Scenario*: Scenario 1:
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
5,000
4,450
75,000
71,250
0
0
80,000
75,700
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
Scenario 2: Scenario 3:
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
5,000
4,450
115,000
109,250
16,121
12,897
136,121
126,597
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
5,000
4,450
95,000
90,250
8,061
6,449
108,061
101,149
5,000
4,450
135,000
128,250
24,182
19,346
164,182
152,046
32=3==32Z=33U=3U33 2= 3 = 2U3~. Z~ 23 ==== = =
EXHIBIT 5-3
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
DEVELOPMENT COST ASSUMPTIONS
ACQUISITION:
Land per sf residual
HARD COSTS:
Demolition (per sf) $2
Site Improvement (per sf) $35
Building Cnstruction Costs (per gsf) $100
Tenant Improvements
Office (per nsf) $20
Cultural Development Costs
Dance Theater (per gsf) $200
Black Box/ExperimentaL Theater (per gsf) $100
SOFT COSTS:
Architectural & Engineering (% Hard Costs) 5%
Development Fee (% Hard Costs) 5%
Insurance & Permits (% Hard Costs) 1.50%
Legal & Accounting (% Hard Costs) 4%
Marketing/Leasing (% Gross Rent RolL) 20%
Real Estate Taxes (per $1000 commercial value) $21.65
Contingency (% Hard Costs) 10%
Arts Contribution (2 % Total Development Costs) 1%
EXHIBIT 5-4
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
PROFILE OF CULTURAL FACILITIES
Type of Facility Approximate Development
Net SF Required Cost/SF
Dance Theater 20,000 $200
(499 Seat)
Performing Arts Theater 20,000 $200
(499 Seat)
Flexible Theater 20,000 $150
(499 Seat)
Black Box/Experimental Theater 13,035 $100
(199 Seat)
Recital/Concert Hall 10,250 $200
(200 Seat)
Jazz Club 7,000 $150
Studios 4,800 $60
(3 i 40' x 40' x 18')
Conercial Art Galleries 2,000 $200
Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority
Barry Abramson & Associates, "Development Potential of
Office and Retail/Connercial Development of Parcel 31
Center City Area of Boston, Mass.," 1988.
Robert Brannigan, Boston Redevelopment Authority Consult
estimated at a development cost of 200 dollars per square. For the 10,000-square-foot
parcel, smaller-supporting cultural facilities such as experimental theaters or studio space
are evaluated at a development cost of 100 dollars per square. Any required cultural
square feet in excess of the space needs of a particular facility are treated as a
contribution to the Cultural District Trust Fund at an equivalent amount to the estimated
development cost. (Exhibit 5-4 illustrates square feet and development cost information for
representative cultural facilities).
Market Assumptions
Both the blight and deterioration in select portions of the District and the potential
for centrally located downtown office space, make it difficult to assume precise market
figures regarding new development. Therefore, the hypothetical development is analyzed
through sensitivity analysis. The analysis is divided into three distinct conditions of
market strength which might characterize the area during its development lifetime:
Existing Market conditions, Weak Local Market conditions and Strong Local Market
conditions. Actual Cultural District development will fall in-between these market
extremes.
The analysis of Existing Market conditions is based on current measurable parameters.
New first class office rents are estimated at 27 dollars per square foot. 9 8 The values of
the individual operating income and expense variables in Exhibit 5-5 are based on
information from potential Cultural District developers, BRA staff, and a recent market
analysis report on the hinge block commissioned by the Center City Task Force in
98 According to the Market Analysis Department of Cushman and Wakefield, average
first class rates in Boston are 35 dollars per square foot and average second class rates are
23 dollars per square foot. Multiplying the existing Midtown second class rate of 18
dollars per square foot by this ratio results in a first class rental rate for Midtown of 27
dollars per square foot. Currently there are no first class office building in the District
for comparison. Cushman and Wakefield defines "Boston" as the traditional downtown
office market as well as Charlestown, Fort Point Channel, North Station, and South
Station.
EXHIBIT 5-5
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
SUMMARY OF OPERATING ASSUMPTIONS
Market Conditions: Existing Market Weak Local Market Strong Local Market
CommerciaL Variables:
Revenues:
RetaiL Rents (per nsf) $35.00 $31.50 $42.00
Office Rents (per nsf) $27.00 $24.30 $32.40
Growth Rental Income (per yr.) 5% 3% 7%
Operating Expenses:
Retail Operating Expenses* (per nsf) $0 $0 so
Office Operating Expenses (per nsf) $5 $5 $5
Growth Operating Expenses (per yr.) 4% 4% 4%
Replacement Reserves (% rent rotl) 1% 1% 1%
RE Taxes (per $1000 com. value) $21.65 $21.65 $21.65
Vacancy (per yr.) 5% 7% 3%
Capitalization Rate 10% 11.50% 8.50%
* Retail operating expenses assume tripLe net leasing of retaiL space.
conjunction with the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce. 9 9
The analysis of Weak Local Market conditions is based on values that might prevail if
development occurred when local economic conditions are less favorable to development of
the District. Specifically, it simulates the impact of office rents at 24 dollars per square
foot (ten percent lower than in Existing Market conditions), increased office vacancy rates,
a slower rate of income growth than is currently projected, and a higher capitalization rate
(reflecting the increased risk of development in the area).
Strong Local Market conditions are based on a more rapid transformation of this
blighted area to a competitive first-class office location. It assumes that first class office
rents are 32 dollars per square foot (twenty percent higher than currently projected),
higher growth rates for rental income, lower vacancy rates, and a lower capitalization rate
(reflecting the lower level of uncertainty and risk associated with development).
Operation Assumptions
Consistent with the Midtown Cultural District premise, this analysis assumes
developers are only responsible for the development of cultural facilities, not their long
term management and operation. However, because operating expenses are a significant
annual cost, if developers become responsible for subsidizing cultural facilities in the
future, their magnitude should be clear. The likelihood of this is uncertain since the
specifics of the Cultural Trust Fund have not been fully detailed. However, in the event
of insufficient operating revenues, it is conceivable developers would need to assist cultural
facilities to keep them in operation so they would not dampen a commercial projects's
attractiveness.
99 Barry M. Abramson & Associates, Development Potential of Office, Residential and
Retail/Commercial Entertainment Development of Parcel 31 in the Center City Area of
Boston, Massachusetts, Prepared for the Center City Task Force, 1988.
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EXHIBIT 5-6
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
SURVEY OF THEATER OPERATING EXPENSES
LOCATION OF NUMBER OF
THEATER PRODUCTIONS
(1986-1987)
Guthrie Theater
Arena Stage
Circle Repertory
Goodman Theater
Mark Taper Forum
Circle in the Square
Shakespeare Theater at Folger
Old Globe Theater*
American Repertory Theater
McCarter Theater
Long Wharf
Coconut Grove
Center Stage
Seattle Repertory Theater
Huntington Theater
Hartford Stage Company
Arizona Theater
Children's Theater Company
Alliance Theater
Alley Theater
South Coast Repertory
Alaska Repertory
Studio Arena Theater
Philadelphia Drama Guild
Cleveland Playhouse
Berkeley Theater
Missouri Repertory Theater
Manhattan Theater Club
Actors Theater of Louisville*
Great Lakes Theater
Trinity Repertory Company
Stage West
Syracuse Stage
George St. Playhouse
Milwaukee Repertory Theater
Cincinnati Playhouse in the Park
Repertory Theater of St. Louis
Yale Repertory Company
People's Light & Theater Co.
Northlight Theater
A Contemporary Theater
TheaterVirginia
Pennsylvania Stage Company
Empty Space Theater
Intiman Theater Company
Tacoma Actors Guild
Barter Theater*
Minneapolis, MN
Washington, DC
New York, NY
Chicago, IL
Los Angeles, CA
New York, NY
Washington, DC
San Diego, CA
Cambridge, MA
Princeton, NJ
New Haven, CT
Coconut Grove, FL
Chicago, IL
Seattle, WA
Boston, MA
Hartford, CT
Tuscon, AZ
Minneapolis, MN
Atlanta, GA
Houston, TX
Costa Mesa, CA
Anchorage, AK
Buffalo, NY
Philadelphia, PA
Cleveland, ON
Berkeley, CA
Kansas City
New York, NY
Louisville, KN
Cleveland, OH
Providence, RI
Springfield, MA
Syracuse, NY
New Brunswick, NJ
Milwaukee, WI
Cincinnati, OH
St. Louis, MO
New Haven, CT
Malvern, PA
Evanstown, IL
Seattle, WA
Richmond, VA
Allentown, PA
Seattle, WA
Seattle, WA
Tacoma, WA
Abingdon, VA
NAME OF
THEATER
OPERATING NUMBER OPERATING
EXPENSES PER OF SEATS EXPENSES
PRODUCTION PER SEAT
OPERATING
EXPENSES
(1986-1987)
$8,284,935
$7,086,500
$4,500,000
$4,457,000
$8,059,000
$1,864,469
$2,395,910
$6,700,000
$4,459,100
$3,781,000
$3,600,000
$3,200,000
$2,697,500
$3,966,400
$2,200,000
$2,500,000
$2,489,758
$3,304,436
$4,793,000
$5,100,000
$4,257,000
$1,742,589
$2,379,500
$2,025,000
$3,700,000
$2,618,200
$2,204,215
$2,159,161
$3,692,000
$1,212,000
$3,300,000
$1,700,000
$1,684,374
$1,359,060
$2,400,000
$2,730,000
$2,748,000
$2,225,000
$1,301,573
$1,040,000
$2,000,900
$1,339,500
$1,170,756
$824,500
$700,241
$681,799
$687,650
$920,548
$885,813
$750,000
$742,833
$732,636
$621,490
$598,978
$558,333
$557,388
$540,143
$514,286
$457,143
$449,583$440,711
$440,000
$416,667
$414,960
$413,055
$399,417
$364,286
$354,750
$348,518
$339,929
$337,500
$336,364
$327,275
$314,888
$308,452
$307,667
$303,000
$300,000
$283,333
$280,729
$271,812
$266,667
$248,182
$229,000
$222,500
$216,929
$208,000
$200,090
$167,438
$167,251
$164,900
$140,048
$113,633
$62,514
1441
1521
682
820
965
160
253
1418
556
2160
683
913
541
998
954
489
1616
1211
1026
1124
868
604
637
1230
1271
551
829
449
896
943
857
546
812
532
1020
849
858
1171
580
298
449
500
274
275
424
299
529
* Indicates Operating Expenses & Number of Productions based on 1985 Information.
Source: Theater Profiles-1988, Theater Communications Group, New York, New York, 1988.
$5,749
$4,659
$6,598
$5,435
$8,351
$11,653
$9,470
$4,725
$8,020
$1,750
$5,271
$3,505
$4,986
$3,974
$2,306
$5,112
$1,541
$2,729
$4,672
$4,537
$4,904
$2,885
$3,735
$1,646
$2,911
$4,752
$2,659
$4,809
$4,121
$1,285
$3,851
$3,114
$2,074
$2,555
$2,353
$3,216
$3,203
$1,900
$2,244
$3,490
$4,456
$2,679
$4,273
$2,998
$1,652
$2,280
$1,300
Average: 8 $2,964,298 $383,822 810 $3,966
Exhibit 5-6 is an overview of the range of operating expenses for a sample of forty-
seven active performing arts facilities. The number of performances is the most influential
factor determining the cultural operating expenses and the number of seats is of secondary
importance.1 0 0 This list states operating expenses per production on average are about
383,822 dollars for a 810 seat theater, but range from a high of 920,548 dollars for a 1441
seat facility to a low of 62,514 dollars for 529 seats. Current estimates indicate that
theaters are typically able to cover about sixty percent of their annual expenses through
earned income, the other forty percent comes from contributions and foundation grants.1 0 1
Because management and operation responsibilities have not been completely determined for
the Midtown Cultural District, how these costs will be covered remains a critical issue for
the life of the District. Further research is needed to evaluate the ability of incentive
zoning to subsidize these expenses if developers are assumed to incur these costs.
100 Interview with Robert Brannigan, BRA Theater Consultant, 7/88.
101 Lindy, Zesch, "Theatre Facts 87," in American Theater, (April 1988), p. 8.
Exhibit 5-7
SUMMARY
A financial model is used to determine the feasibility for constructing cultural
facilities in different conditions of market strength under alternative levels of development
beyond as of right (Exhibit 5-7). The assumptions discussed in this chapter underlie the
calculations made in the remainder of Part II to evaluate the costs and benefits from the
perspective of the developer, the city and the community, respectively.
EXHIBIT 6-1
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
EXPLANATION OF VARIABLES FOR ESTIMATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Gross Building Area =
Net Building Area =
SF Bonus Office Space
for Scenarios Above
As of Right
SF Cultural Facility =
Total Development Costs =
Average Development Costs =
Effective Gross Income =
Average Income/SF
Operating Expenses =
Average Operating Expenses/SF =
Net Operating Income =
Capitalized Value in Yr. 3 =
Land Residual =
Capitalized Value of
Bonus Office Space
for Scenarios Above =
As of Right
Net Capitalized Value
Bonus Office Space
Net Capitalized Value
Bonus Office Space/SF
Total square feet of building area, including
comnercial and cultural facilities.
Total square feet of usable building area, including
commerciaL and cultural facilties.
Additional comnercial square feet above what
is allowed under As of Right conditions permitted
in exchange for providing cultural facilities.
Required square feet of cultural faciliLty in return
for bonus comnercial square feet.
Conmnercial and cultural costs of development.
Total Development Costs, divided by gross building area.
Difference between total revenues and vacancy.
Effective gross income, divided by the gross
comnercial square feet.
Operating expenses include utilities, maintenance,
and real estate taxes.
Operating expenses, divided by the gross commercial
square feet.
Difference between the effective gross income and
total operating expenses.
Net operating income in the stabilized year of operation
divided by a lending rate appropriate to market conditions
to determine a total building value or "capitalized value."
Difference between the total development cost and
and the capitalized building value.
Difference between the land residual for each Bonus
Scenario and the land residual for As of Right.
For Scenarios 1-3, the difference between the capitalized
value of bonus office space and the construction cost of
cultural facilities.
Net capitalized value, divided by the total bonus
commercial square feet.
CIIAPTER 6
INCENTIVE ZONING: THE DEVELOPER'S PERSPECTIVE
The analysis of the costs and benefits of incentive zoning from the private
developer's perspective reveals the feasibility of the proposed four-to-one incentive zoning
ratio to stimulate the development of cultural facilities in Midtown Boston. (Chapter 2
describes the specifics of the proposed zoning regulation.) Development feasibility is
analogous to developer benefits or alternatively, infeasibility is comparable to costs. In
this analysis, rental incomes for the proposed mixed-use buildings are capitalized and short
and long-term rates of return are determined in order to value the zoning incentive in
relation to the cost of developing the required cultural facilities.
40,000-SQUARE-FOOT PARCEL
As of right, the 40,000-square-foot site has a potential for 320,000 gross square feet
of development. However, by including cultural amenities, the maximum square feet can be
increased to over 600,000 square feet by the proposed incentive zoning. 10 2 According to
the proposed zoning, the required square feet of cultural amenity are calculated over and
above the square footage allowed at a total cost in proportion to one fourth the value of
the additional office square feet. 10 3
The costs and benefits to the developer of the cultural facility can be analyzed
through a hypothetical financial statement that takes into account the varying levels of
incentive in each scenario (Exhibit 6-2, 6-3 and 6-4). (Exhibit 6-1 explains the variables
102 This amount is calculated as follows: FAR of 14 x 40,000 square feet + 48,000
square feet of required cultural amenity = 608,000.
103 This calculation determines how much cultural square feet is required at different
FARs of development based on a one-to-four zoning formula. By taking the inverse of the
codes's four-to-one formula, it is equivalent to determining the amount of bonus office
square feet granted as a result of providing a certain amount of cultural facilities.
EXHIBIT 6-2
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
DEVELOPER ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, EXISTING MARKET CONDITIONS, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right*
FAR: (FAR = 8)
Parcel Land Area 40,000
Gross Building Area(1) 320,000
Net Building Area 302,800
SF Bonus Office Space for
Scenarios Above As of Right
SF of Cultural Facility 0
Scenario 1
(FAR = 10)
40,000
416,121
391,697
80,000
16,121
Scenario 2
(FAR = 12)
40,000
512,243
480,594
160,000
32,243
Total Development Costs
Average Development Costs/SF(2)
Effective Gross Income
Average Income/SF
Operating Expenses(3)
Average Operating Expenses/SF
Net Operating Income(4)
$51,588,785
$161
$7,902,100
$25
($2,805,946)
($9)
$5,096,154
Capitalized Value In Year 3(5) $50,961,540
(Less Total Development Costs) ($51,588,785)
Total Land Residual ($627,245)
Capitalized Value of Bonus
Office Space for Scenarios
Above As of Right
(Total Land Residual for each Scenario
Total Land Residual for As of Right)
(Less Construction Cost of Cultural
Facility 2 $200/SF)
Net Capitalized Value of Bonus
Office Space to Developer
Net Capitalized Value of
Bonus Office Space/SF
$67,608,296
$162
$9,851,500
$25
($3,479,045)
($9)
$6,372,455
$63,724,554
($67,608,296)
($3,883,742)
($3,256,497)
($3,224,299)
$83,561,212
$163
$11,800,900
$25
($4,154,587)
($9)
$7,646,313
$99,547,426
$164
$13,750,300
$25
($4,831,415)
($9)
$8,918,885
$76,463,128 $89,188,848
($83,561,212) ($99,547,426)
($7,098,084) ($10,358,578)
($6,470,840) ($9,731,334)
($6,448,598) ($9,672,897)
($6,480,796) ($12,919,438)
($81)
($19,404,231)
($81) ($81)
As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
Cultural Facility excluded from FAR calculation so GBA > FAR * parcel area.
Although based conercial building costs are constant, as increased cultural space is built
the average construction costs changes.
Operating Costs as listed include replacement reserve and RE taxes, but not linkage
NOI before linkage, after RE taxes
Based on NOI in yr. 3
Scenario 3
(FAR = 14)
40,000
608,364
569,492
240,000
48,364
EXHIBIT 6-3
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
DEVELOPER ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, WEAK LOCAL MARKET CONDITIONS, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right*
FAR: (FAR = 8)
Parcel Land Area 40,000
Gross Building Area(1) 320,000
Net Building Area 302,800
SF Bonus Office Space for
Scenarios Above As of Right
SF of Cultural Facility
Total Development Costs
Average Development Costs/SF(2)
Effective Gross Income
Average Income/SF
Operating Expenses(3)
Average Operating Expenses/SF
Net Operating Income(4)
$51,536,201
$161
$6,962,166
$22
($2,463,929)
($8)
$4,498,237
Scenario 1
(FAR a 10)
40,000
416,105
391,684
80,000
16,105
$67,357,533
$162
$8,679,690
$22
($3,064,220)
($8)
$5,615,470
Scenario 2
(FAR = 12)
40,000
512,210
480,568
160,000
32,210
$83,298,079
$163
$10,397,214
$22
($3,666,345)
($8)
$6,730,869
Scenario 3
(FAR = 14)
40,000
608,315
569,452
240,000
48,315
$99,238,625
$163
$12,114,738
$22
($4,269,436)
($8)
$7,845,302
Capitalized Value In Year 3(5) $39,115,105
(Less Total Development Costs) ($51,536,201)
Total Land Residual ($12,421,096)
$48,830,177
($67,357,533)
($18,527,357)
$58,529,293 $68,220,015
($83,298,079) ($99,238,625)
($24,768,787) ($31,018,610)
Capitalized Value of Bonus
Office Space for Scenarios
Above As of Right
(Total Land Residual for Each Scenario -
Total Land Residual for As of Right)
(Less Construction Cost of Cultural
Facility 2 $200/SF)
($6,106,261) ($12,347,691) ($18,597,514)
($3,221,013)
($9,327,273)
Net Capitalized Value of Bonus
Office Space to Developer
Net Capitalized Value of
Bonus Office Space/SF ($117)
($6,442,025) ($9,663,038)
($18,789,716) ($28,260,552)
($117) ($118)
As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
Cultural facility excluded from FAR calculation so GBA > FAR * parcel area.
Although based conercial building costs are constant, as increased cultural space is built
the average construction costs changes.
Operating costs as listed include replacement reserve and RE taxes, but not linkage.
NOI before linkage, after RE taxes
Based on NOI in yr. 3
EXHIBIT 6-4
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
DEVELOPER ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, STRONG LOCAL MARKET, YEAR 3
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE:
FAR:
Parcel Land Area
Gross Building Area(1)
Net Building Area
SF Bonus Office Space for
Scenarios Above As of Right
SF of Cultural Facility
Total Development Costs
Average Development Costs/SF(2)
Effective Gross Income
Average Income/SF
Operating Expenses(3)
Average Operating Expenses/SF
Net Operating Income(4)
Capitalized Value In Year 3(5)
(Less Total Development Costs)
Total Land Residual
As of Right*
(FAR = 8)
40,000
320,000
302,800
$51,932,380
$162
$9,682,152
$30
($3,472,680)
($11)
$6,209,472
Scenario 1
(FAR = 10)
40,000
416,229
391,783
80,000
16,229
$68,024,831
$163
$12,070,680
$30
($4,287,644)
(011)
$7,783,036
$73,052,613 $91,565,125
($51,932,380) ($68,024,831)
$21,120,233 $23,540,295
Capitalized Value of Bonus
Office Space for Scenarios
Above As of Right
(Total Land Residual for each Scenario -
Total Land Residual for As of Right)
(Less Construction Cost of Cultural
Facility B $200/SF)
Net Capitalized Value of Bonus
Office Space to Developer
$2,420,061
(3,245,774)
($825,713)
Net Capitalized Value of
Bonus Office Space/SF ($10)
Scenario 2
(FAR = 12)
40,000
512,458
480,766
160,000
32,458
$84,117,282
$164
$14,459,208
S30
($5,106,271)
($11)
$9,352,937
$110,034,553
($84,117,282)
$25,917,271
$4,797,037
(6,491,547)
($1,694,510)
($11)
Scenario 3
(FAR . 14)
40,000
608,687
569,749
240,000
48,687
$100,209,733
$165
$16,847,736
$30
($5,926,823)
($11)
$10,920,913
$128,481,330
($100,209,733)
$28,271,597
$7,151,363
(9,737,321)
($2,585,958)
($11)
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
(1) Cultural facility excluded from FAR calculation so GBA > FAR * parcel area.
(2) Although based commercial building costs are constant, as increased cultural space is built
the average construction costs changes.
(3) Operating costs as listed include replacement reserve and RE taxes, but not Linkage.
(4) NOI before Linkage, after RE taxes
(5) Based on NOI in yr. 3
of the financial statement.) The cost of dance or recital facilities required to build
Scenario 1 is 3.2 million dollars and under Scenario 3 is 9.7 million dollars. The
development benefit of the cultural amenity comes from the 80,000 to 240,000 square feet
of increased floor area for income-producing uses.1 0 4
1. Costs of Incentive Zoning to the Developer
Total development costs range from approximately 52 million dollars under As of Right
development (without cultural facilities) to 100 million dollars under Scenario 3 in Strong
Local Market conditions. Although per-unit construction costs are assumed to be constant
throughout the analysis at 161 dollars per square foot, average development costs per
square foot increase marginally as cultural space is added. (Unit costs might vary between
buildings of different heights, but in order to keep the analysis straightforward, the costs
figures were not adjusted.) Actual development costs may be higher depending on the deal
struck with the City to acquire the land.
Operating expenses are also held constant across scenarios at 5 dollars per square
foot, but annual increases are varied depending on market conditions of the analysis.
(Fixed costs for elevator operation and building management might vary due to economies
of scale, but because these variations would be slight the analysis assumes the same
expenses between different development scenarios.)
The results of the analysis from the developer's point of view are summarized in
Exhibits 6-2, 6-3 and 6-4. They indicate the project is not feasible as currently conceived
under any market conditions. With the exception of Strong Local Market conditions
(Exhibit 6-4), the land residual under As of Right development is negative. The negative
land residual indicates the project does not generate enough revenues for land purchase or
payment of linkage exactions. Only when rents reach 27.50 dollars per square feet or
104 The analysis assumed rents are constant regardless of building height.
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EXHIBIT 6-5
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
DEVELOPER ANALYSIS: MEASURES OF RETURN
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR = 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
Existing Market Conditions:
Return on Total Assets 9.88% 9.43% 9.15% 8.96%
Internal Rate of Return 13.55% 12.74% 12.24% 11.89%
Weak Local Market Conditions:
Return on Total Assets 8.73% 8.34% 8.08% 7.91%
Internal Rate of Return 8.53% 7.78% 7.27% 6.92%
Strong Local Market Conditions:
Return on Total Assets 11.96% 11.44% 11.12% 10.90%
Internal Rate of Return 20.05% 19.24% 18.72% 18.36%
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
capitalization rates decline to 9.75 percent in Existing Market conditions and 31.50 dollars
per square foot or 7.75 percent in Weak Market conditions is the land residual positive
(Appendix Exhibit 6-1 and 6-3). Even without the cost of providing cultural facilities or
land, the development cost of the project is greater than its capitalized value in Existing
and Weak Market conditions. Increased FAR only enlarges the negative land residual
because currently prevailing office rents in the District are not high enough to offset the
cost of constructing bonus space and required cultural facilities. The cost spread between
200 dollars per square foot for cultural facilities and 161 dollars per square foot for
commercial space exaggerates the total development cost. The negative capitalized value in
Strong Local Market conditions indicates even if the land residual were positive, the cost
difference between anticipated rents and development costs is too great to create a net
benefit. Decreasing cultural development costs to 180 dollars per square foot in Strong
Market conditions for Scenario 1, does make the net value of additional office space
positive. Perhaps surprisingly, the higher the level of development, the lower the cultural
development costs must be to create a positive value (Appendix Exhibit 6-5).
Exhibit 6-5 shows how the estimated measures of return decline with increases in
height and density, as the buildings provide greater cultural square feet. (These returns
would decrease further if land costs were included in the model.) Even though the value
of bonus office space as currently estimated is negative, the IRRs may be sufficient for a
developer to initiate the project. After the District becomes less risky and rent levels
reach 32.50 dollars per square feet or capitalization rates decline to 7.50 percent during
otherwise characteristic Existing Market conditions for Scenario 3, the value of bonus
space turns positive and returns are higher (Appendix Exhibit 6-2).
These seemingly discouraging results are created by the fact that the scenarios
include up to 75 percent of additional first class office space beyond As of Right yet, only
when the rents approach those for existing first class downtown office buildings or
SUMMARY EXHIBIT 6-6
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
DEVELOPER ANALYSIS: NET CAPITALIZED VALUE OF BONUS OFFICE SPACE
COMPARISON OF BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: Scenario I Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR a 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
Existing Market Conditions ($6,480,796) ($12,919,438) ($19,404,231)
Weak Local Market Conditions ($9,327,273) ($18,789,716) (S28,260,552)
Strong Local Market Conditions ($825,713) ($1,694,510) ($2,585,958)
As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
capitalization rates substantially relax, is the value of additional space positive. In
addition to the model's lower assumed office rents, developers are being asked to provide
and carry as much as 48,000 square feet of non-income generating performing arts and
dance theaters. Although these one-time fixed costs for cultural facilities can be amortized
over time, their impact is significant in the short term if the developer's financial position
is already strained.
2. Benefits of Incentive Zoning to the Developer
The negative net benefit of additional office space after providing cultural amenity
under all market conditions is summarized in Exhibit 6-6. The negative value of bonus
office space under Scenario 3 in Existing Market conditions is nearly equal to the negative
value of additional office space under Scenario 2 in Weak conditions. Strong Local Market
conditions mitigate the negative outcomes in Weak and Existing Market conditions, but
even under Scenario 3, the benefit is not large enough to provide a positive value
stabilizing the pro-forma. Although the prestige of a Cultural District location suggests
the potential for higher rents over time, even under the analysis of Strong Local Market
conditions in the current context such benefits are financially insufficient.
EXHIBIT 6-7
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
DEVELOPER ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, EXISTING MARKET CONDITIONS, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARSON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right*
FAR: (FAR x 8)
Parcel Land Area 10,000
Gross Building Area(1) 80,000
Net Building Area 75,700
SF Bonus Office Space for
Scenarios Above As of Right
SF of Cultural Facility
Total Development Costs
Average Development Costs/SF(2)
Effective Gross Income
Average Income/SF
Operating Expenses(3)
Average Operating Expenses/SF
Net Operating Income(4)
$12,897,196
$161
$1,975,525
$24.69
($701,486)
($8.77)
$1,274,039
Capitalized Value In Year 3(5) $12,740,385
(Less Total Development Costs) ($12,897,196)
Total Land Residual ($156,811)
Capitalized Value of Bonus
Office Space for Scenarios
Above As of Right
(Less Construction Cost of Cultural
Facility a $100/SF)
Net Capitalized Value of Bonus
Office Space to Developer
Net Capitalized Value of
Bonus Office Space/SF
Scenario 1
(FAR = 10)
10,000
108,061
101,149
20,000
8,061
$16,893,750
$156
$2,462,875
$24.63
($855,119)
($8.55)
$1,607,756
$16,077,562
($16,893,750)
($816,187)
($659,376)
($806,075)
($1,465,451)
($73)
Scenario 2
(FAR a 12)
10,000
136,121
126,597
40,000
16,121
$20,890,303
$153
$2,950,225
$24.59
($1,011,327)
($8.43)
$1,938,898
Scenario 3
(FAR = 14)
10,000
164,182
152,046
60,000
24,182
$24,886,857
S152
$3,437,575
$24.55
($1,168,791)
($8.35)
$2,268,784
$19,388,976 $22,687,836
($20,890,303) ($24,886,857)
($1,501,327) ($2,199,020)
($1,344,516)
($1,612,150)
($2,956,665)
($2,042,209)
($2,418,224)
($4,460,433)
($74) ($74)
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As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
Cultural facility excluded from FAR calculation so GBA > FAR * parcel area.
Although base commercial building costs are constant, as increased cultural space is built
the average construction costs changes.
Operating costs as listed include replacement reserve and RE taxes, but not linkage.
NOI before linkage, after RE taxes
Based on NOI in yr. 3
10,000-SQUARE-FOOT PARCEL
The analysis of a 10,000-square-foot parcel is representative of the impact of
incentive zoning on the smaller parcels in the Midtown Cultural District. The 10,000-
square-foot parcel can accommodate one-quarter of the development of the larger parcel--
up to 150,000 square feet under Scenario 3 and 80,000 commercial square feet under As of
Right. The maximum build would be possible with the provision of 24,000 additional square
feet of cultural facilities in the form of an experimental theater or artist studios, the
likely types of cultural facilities to be developed on parcels of this size.
Exhibits 6-7, 6-8 and 6-9 summarize the costs and benefits in a financial statement
for this parcel under different development scenarios.
1. Costs of Incentive Zoning to the Developer
Total development costs to the developer range from approximately 13 million dollars
to 25 million dollars under different development scenarios. Because the square foot
development costs for an experimental theater or studio space are lower (approximately 100
dollars per square feet) than those for income-producing components of the project,
average development costs decline as FAR and cultural space increase.
Average operating costs are identical to the larger development project. Actual unit
costs may be higher because the proposed building is one-quarter the size of the former
site and therefore does not benefit from economies of scale, but because these differences
would not be great, adjustments were not made.
Estimated financial statements indicate the project is marginally feasible in Strong
Local Market conditions (Exhibit 6-9). However, in both Existing and Weak Market
conditions, development costs are higher than the capitalized building value (Exhibit 6-7
and 6-8). Under As of Right development in existing market conditions, the land residual
is positive only when rents reach 27.50 dollars per square foot or capitalization rates fall
EXHIBIT 6-8
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
DEVELOPER ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, WEAK LOCAL MARKET CONDITIONS, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE:
FAR:
Parcel Land Area
Gross Building Area(1)
Net Building Area
SF Bonus Office Space for
Scenarios Above As of Right
SF of Cultural Facility
Total Development Costs
Average Development Costs/SF(2)
Effective Gross Income
Average Income/SF
Operating Expenses(3)
Average Operating Expenses/SF
Net Operating Income(4)
Capitalized Value In Year 3(5)
(Less Total Development Costs)
Total Land Residual
Capitalized Value of Bonus
Office Space for Scenarios
Above As of Right
(Total Land Residual for Each Scenario -
Total Land Residual for As of Right)
(Less Construction Cost of Cultural
Facility B 100/SF
Net Capitalized Value of Bonus
Office Space to Developer
Net Capitalized Value of
Bonus Office Space/SF
As of Right* Scenario 1
(FAR = 8) (FAR = 10)
10,000 10,000
80,000 108,034
75,700 101,127
20,000
8,034
$12,854,247
$161
$1,740,542
$22
($615,982)
($8)
$1,124,559
$9,778,776
($12,854,247)
($3,075,471)
$16,837,521
$156
$2,169,922
$22
($755,242)
($8)
$1,414,680
$12,301,566
($16,837,521)
($4,535,955)
($1,460,484)
($803,390)
($2,263,874)
($113)
Scenario 2 Scenario 3
(FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
10,000 10,000
136,068 164,102
126,554 151,981
40,000
16,068
$20,820,794
$153
$2,599,304
$22
($896,418)
($8)
S1,702,886
60,000
24,102
$24,855,992
$151
$3,028,685
$22
($1,038,526)
($7)
$1,990,158
$14,807,704 $17,305,725
($20,820,794) ($24,855,992)
($6,013,090) (S7,550,267)
($2,937,620)
($1,606,781)
($4,544,400)
($4,474,796)
($2,410,171)
($6,884,967)
($114) ($115)
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
(1) Cultural facility excluded from FAR calculation so GBA > FAR * parcel area.
(2) Although base commercial building costs are constant, as increased cultural space is built
the average construction costs changes.
(3) operating costs as listed include replacement reserve and RE taxes, but not linkage.
(4) NOI before linkage, after RE taxes
(5) Based on NOI in yr. 3
EXHIBIT 6-9
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
DEVELOPER ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, STRONG LOCAL MARKET CONDITIONS, YEAR 3
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right*
FAR: (FAR = 8)
Parcel Land Area 10,000
Gross Building Area(1) 80,000
Net Building Area 75,700
SF Bonus Office Space for
Scenarios Above As of Right
SF of Cultural Facility
Total Development Costs
Average Development Costs/SF(2)
Effective Gross Income
Average Income/SF
Operating Expenses(3)
Average Operating Expenses/SF
Net Operating Income(4)
$12,983,095
$162
%2,420,538
$30
(1868,170)
($11)
$1,552,368
Capitalized Value In Year 3(5) $18,263,153
(Less Total Development Costs) ($12,983,095)
Total Land Residual $5,280,058
Scenario 1
(FAR = 10)
10,000
108,114
101,192
20,000
8,114
$17,006,208
S157
$3,017,670
$30
(11,049,787)
(110)
S1,967,883
$23,151,565
($17,006,208)
$6,145,357
Scenario 2 Scenario 3
(FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
10,000 10,000
136,229 164,343
126,683 152,175
40,000
16,229
121,029,320
S154
S3,614,802
S30
($1,235,286)
(110)
S2,379,516
60,000
24,343
$25,052,433
$152
14,211,934
S30
($1,422,676)
(110)
S2,789,258
$27,994,302 S32,814,805
($21,029,320) (S25,052,433)
16,964,982 S7,762,372
Capitalized Value of Bonus
Office Space for Scenarios
Above As of Right
(Total Land Residual for Each Scenario -
Total Land Residual for As of Right)
(Less Construction Cost of Cultural
Facility B $100/SF)
Net Capitalized Value of Bonus
Office Space to Developer
Net Capitalized Value of
Bonus Office Space/SF
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
$865,299
(811,443)
$53,856
$1,684,923
(1,622,887)
$62,036
$2,482,314
(2,434,330)
S47,983
EXHIBIT 6-10
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
DEVELOPER ANALYSIS: MEASURES OF RETURN
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right*
FAR: (FAR = 8)
Existing Market Conditions:
Return on Total Assets 9.88%
Internal Rate of Return 13.55%
Weak Local Market Conditions:
Return on Total Assets
Internal Rate of Return
Strong Local Market Conditions:
Return on Total Assets
Internal Rate of Return
8.75%
8.57%
11.96%
20.05%
Scenario 1
(FAR = 10)
9.52%
12.91%
8.40%
7.90%
11.57%
19.45%
Scenario 2 Scenario 3
(FAR a 12) (FAR = 14)
9.28%
12.48%
8.18%
7.46%
11.32%
19.04%
9.12%
12.81%
8.01%
7.12%
11.13%
18.75%
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
EXHIBIT 6-11
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
DEVELOPER ANALYSIS: NET CAPITALIZED VALUE OF BONUS OFFICE SPACE
COMPARISON OF BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: Scenario I Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
............................................................................
Existing Market Conditions ($1,465,451) ($2,956,665) ($4,460,433)
Weak Local Market Conditions ($2,263,874) ($4,544,400) ($6,884,967)
Strong Local Market Conditions $53,856 $62,036 $47,983
* As of Right Scenario does not incLude cuLturaL faciLities
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to 9.75 percent. Rents must rise to 31.50 dollars per square foot or cap rates fall to 7.75
percent for the value of As of Right development in Weak Market conditions to break even
with development costs (Appendix Exhibit 6-6 and 6-8). The development cost spread
between 161 dollars per square feet for commercial and 100 dollars per square feet for
cultural facilities lowers the per unit total development costs, but when the land residual
for increased office space is negative, the gap is too small. Even if the cultural
development costs were as low as 60 dollars per square foot, the value of additional office
space would remain negative (Appendix Exhibit 6-7 and 6-9).
Exhibit 6-10 indicates that the estimated rates of return for the smaller parcel are
similar to those of the previous analysis. Once again, they decline with additional FAR
and increased cultural facilities. Rents in Existing Market conditions under Scenario 3
must be close to 32.00 dollars per square foot in order for additional office space to create
positive return. However, if the District does not development quickly and Weak Market
conditions prevail with capitalization rates above 7.25 percent, the value of office space
beyond the As of Right level will remain negative (Appendix Exhibit 6-7 and 6-9).
2. Benefits of Incentive Zoning to the Developer
Benefits to the developer for bonus office space are summarized in Exhibit 6-11.
With the exception development in Strong Market conditions, the net benefit is negative.
The negative value of additional office space in Existing conditions is comparable to the
value at the lower level of development in Weak market conditions, i.e., in Existing
conditions under Scenario 3, the negative value is approximately the same as the negative
value in Weak conditions under Scenario 2. In Strong Market conditions developers of the
10,000-square-foot parcel can anticipate the greatest total value from additional office
space under Scenario 2 development. However, the value per square foot of additional
space is marginally better for development under the Scenario 1 level. In comparison to
the 40,000-square-foot parcel, the developer of the 10,000-square-foot parcel may marginally
101
benefit from lower land costs than a developer acquiring an already assembled larger
parcel.
SUMMARY
This analysis demonstrates that only when market conditions are strong, cultural
development costs relatively low, and parcel sizes relatively small, does the prescribed
zoning formula provide ample incentive to leverage the development of cultural facilities.
Under all other market conditions and development scenarios the subsidy of incentive
zoning is insufficient to encourage cultural development. Long-term potential for returns,
may be greater, but in the short-term the development cost for constructing relatively
large first-class office sites and cultural facilities is less than the value to the developer
of increased office density in the deteriorated Cultural District market. Increasing the
FAR does not have a positive impact because the prevailing rents in the District are not
substantial enough to offset the additional development cost of office and cultural space.
Despite these financial issues, the political benefit of including cultural facilities may
provide an additional incentive to the developer if the public approval process is shorter.
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EXHIBIT 7-1
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: REAL ESTATE TAX REVENUES, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR a 8) (FAR = 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
Existing Market Conditions $1,384,284 $1,719,616 $2,054,949 $2,390,281
Weak Local Market Conditions $1,028,338 $1,276,665 $1,524,991 $1,773,318
Strong Local Market Conditions $2,077,721 $2,583,033 $3,088,346 $3,593,658
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
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CHAPTER 7
INCENTIVE ZONING: THE CITY'S POINT OF VIEW
From Boston's perspective the benefits from incentive zoning for incentive zoning are
much easier to quantify than their associated costs. Not only does the city benefit from
the redevelopment of a blighted downtown area with minimal investment of public funds,
but it also has the potential to broaden its tax base and increase its employment pool.
From the city's perspective, the costs of incentive zoning pertain to the additional drain
on municipal services, and environmental and land-use qualitative considerations. This
analysis focuses on an evaluation of the impact of incentive zoning on local real estate and
personal income tax revenues in Massachusetts, and does not consider the qualitative
impacts.
40,000-SQUARE-FOOT PARCEL
A. Benefits of Incentive Zoning to the City
1. Real Estate Tax Benefit
Real estate tax benefits vary considerably depending on development levels and
different market conditions. (Exhibit 7-1 shows the potential Boston real estate tax
revenues for a stabilized year of operation in different market conditions.) 10 5 Comparison
of these revenues indicates that in Existing Market conditions under Scenario 2, the level
of anticipated tax revenue is 2 million dollars and is comparable to the amount estimated in
Strong Market conditions under As of Right development. Under Scenario I in Existing
Market conditions, the tax level is 1.7 million dollars, close to what is expected under
Weak Market conditions in Scenario 3. There is more than a 160 percent difference in
City
105 These total real estate tax revenues do not net out the current real estate tax
payment on vacant land.
EXHIBIT 7-2
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: EMPLOYMENT GENERATED, ALL MARKET CONDITIONS
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE:
FAR:
As of Right*
(FAR w 8)
Construction Enployment
Permanent Employment 1,414
Scenario 1
(FAR a 10)
1,793
Scenario 2
(FAR x 12)
Scenario 3
(FAR a 14)
2,173 2,553
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
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tax revenues between the lowest and the highest revenue producing scenario. 10 6
2. Employment Generated
The model accounts for construction and permanent jobs created by the development
project. While the number of jobs created is not directly factored into the analysis as a
benefit from the City's perspective, this estimate is necessary in order to calculate its
increased share of state taxes. The number of new jobs created varies according to the
scale of the proposed development. The number of construction jobs is three-quarters
higher under the Scenario 3 development level than under As of Right. The number of
permanent jobs is four-fifths higher under Scenario 3 than As of Right (Exhibit 7-2).
To calculate the potential number of construction jobs, 23 percent of the construction
hard costs are assumed allocated to wages.107 Dividing total wages in each scenario by
the 1986 annual construction wage of 29,760 dollars, gives the estimate of the number of
jobs created. 10 8 Estimated construction jobs range from 297 under As of Right
development to 518 under Scenario 3.
The anticipated number of permanent jobs is based on the square footage requirements
of different occupations varying from 220 square feet per office worker, 440 square feet
per retail employee to 1000 square feet per cultural employee. 10 9 Permanent jobs are
estimated at 1,414 under As of Right development and 2,553 under Scenario 3. This
analysis assumes different market conditions have no impact on the number of jobs created.
106 The real estate tax payment is calculated by capitalizing the net income stream
and multiplying by the current tax rate of $21.65 per $1000 of commercial value. This
method of capitalizing a building's net income stream is referred to as the capitalization
method for assessing value.
107 Interview with John Avault, Boston Redevelopment Authority, Research
Department, 7/88.
108 1986 Area Wage Survey of the Construction Industry.
109 Interview with John Avault, 7/88.
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EXHIBIT 7-3
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: PERSONAL TAX REVENUES, ALL MARKET CONDITIONS
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR . 8) (FAR . 10) (FAR 3 12) (FAR . 14)
Income Tax Revenues $221,093 $280,487 $339,881 $399,275
Sales Tax Revenues $25,506 $25,506 $25,506 $25,506
Total Personal Tax Revenues $246,599 $305,993 $365,387 $424,781
As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
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3. Personal Tax Benefit
Increased employment benefits the City in a fiscal sense because it receives a
proportion of both the State income tax and the State retail sales tax. Because the
amount of retail space is constant for each FAR, City revenues from retail sales tax are
assumed constant between scenarios. The difference between As of Right personal tax
benefits and Scenario 3 is 180,00 dollars (Exhibit 7-3).
The total number of permanent employees times the average income ($23,000) times 80
percent gives an estimate of the total taxable income. This income is taxed by the State
at a rate of five percent and of these revenues approximately seventeen percent are
allocated to the City of Boston. A similar system is used to distribute revenues from the
State retail sales tax to the City. The number of retail employees times 60,015 dollars,
(the 1986 ratio of retail sales/employee), approximates the total retail sales volume for the
hypothetical development. Of the total sales, five percent is taxed by the State sales tax,
and approximately seventeen percent of these taxes is returned to the City.1 10
4. Other Benefits
Cities other than Boston also benefit from a designated hotel taxes and sales tax on
entertainment ticket sales. In Boston the State levies approximately a six percent hotel
tax and the City adds to this a four percent local tax. Although cities, like San Francisco
designate a certain percentage of these tax revenues to the arts, in Boston all revenues are
contributed to the General Fund for necessary city services including education, police and
fire protection. It is unlikely a designated tax would ever be implemented in Boston
because of the dependency of the City budget are existing tax generating sources.I I I
The City currently taxes five percent on all sales of goods over 100 dollars. In 1984
110 Interview with Gregory Perkins, Boston Redevelopment Authority, Research
Department, 6/88.
111 Interview with Catherine Royce, 7/22/88.
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EXHIBIT 7-4
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: FISCAL IMPACTS-RE TAX REVENUES & PERSONAL TAX REVENUES, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARISON OF AS OR RIGHT WITH BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR 2 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
Existing Market Conditions $1,630,883 $2,025,609 $2,420,336 $2,815,062
Weak Local Market Conditions $1,274,937 $1,582,658 $1,890,378 $2,198,099
Strong Local Market Conditions $2,324,320 $2,889,026 $3,513,127 $3,593,658
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
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there was limited interest in an entertainment tax to broaden the City tax base, but the
arts community was adamantly opposed because of its impact on raising tickets. At that
time the proposal was defeated and because of continued arts opposition it is not likely to
be reconsidered.
Linkage payments for employment training and housing are not calculated as a benefit
to the city because they are directly allocated to the impacted community. It is also
unclear whether the City will be able to exact payments from developers based on the
prescribed linkage formula in additional to requiring cultural facilities. Whether or not this
assumption is accurate is a function of the ultimate political will of the City.
5. Net Benefits
Net fiscal benefits for the city are the combined estimated of revenues for real estate
and personal taxes. The potential fiscal benefits for the City in Strong Market conditions
under Scenario 3 are almost 3.6 million dollars. This level is over double what is estimated
for City revenues in Existing Market conditions under As of Right development (Exhibit 7-
4).
B. Costs of Incentive Zoning to the City
The costs of incentive zoning to the city are largely attributed to the expense of
additional municipal services including utilities, transportation, fire and police protection
due to increased office space and additional employees from office development beyond as
of right. Additional costs relating to the environmental considerations of increasing
congestion and deteriorating air and water quality are also significant, but not
quantitatively evaluated. Additional strain on the public transportation is the most easily
quantified and also the most directly impacted by office development beyond as of right.
As Kayden states:
The marginal costs of providing municipal services such as water and sewer
services, sanitation, police and fire protection are negligible...Provision of subway
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EXHIBIT 7-5
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: TRANSPORTATION DEMAND, ALL MARKET CONDITIONS
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR =8) (FAR = 10) (FAR a 12) (FAR = 14)
Employees Using Public Transit 424 538 652 766
As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
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public transportation is the cost potentially most affected by an incentive zoning policy.112
1. Public Transportation Costs
Thirty percent of downtown employees are estimated to be Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority (MBTA) public transit commuters. Depending on the total project
size, the employees likely to use public transit range from 479 under As of Right
development to 766 under Scenario 3 (Exhibit 7-5).113 The number of employees beyond As
of Right conditions is relatively small in relation to the 1986 estimate of 600,000 total
weekday riders on the MBTA system.1 14 A larger portion of employees in the Midtown
Cultural District could conceivably use public transportation in the future given the
District's proximity to three different "T" lines. Additionally, the Central Artery/Third
Harbor Tunnel and the South Station Project is expected to expand public transit ridership
city-wide as more commuters look for alternatives to the private automobile.
Capital costs for MBTA vehicles are typically incurred by the State. However, the
additional demand on the MBTA system is likely to impact the City through operating
expenses for which the City pays in proportion to its use. However, the assertion that
there would be additional costs is based on the premise that the MBTA is currently at it
peak capacity and would be unable to accommodate additional riders without increasing its
current number of staff and vehicles. All of these factors contribute to make it impossible
to establish a cost to the city for increased transit usage.
2. Other Costs
Other costs to the city include increased demand for water and sewage services,
police protection and fire protection. The impact of the additional office space and the
112 Jerold S. Kayden, Incentive Zoning in New York City: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,
p. 54.
113 Total number of rides for the project would be twice this number.
114 Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 1985 Annual Report.
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additional 1,100 permanent workers due to incentive zoning on these other city services is
assumed negligible. The impact on these services for the District as a whole is much
greater.
C. Net Impact of Incentive Zoning to the City
For the costs of incentive zoning to outweigh the fiscal benefits, these costs would
have to exceed the 2 million dollars of revenue beyond As of Right development under
Scenario 3. This outcome is unlikely because of the relatively small costs associated with
the additional number of employees.
EXHIBIT 7-6
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: REAL ESTATE TAX REVENUES, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR =8) (FAR = 10) (FAR.= 12) (FAR a 14)
...............................................................................................................
Existing Market Conditions $346,071 $429,904 S513,737 $597,570
Weak Local Market Conditions S257,085 $319,166 $381,248 $443,329
Strong Local Market Conditions $519,430 $645,758 $772,086 $898,414
* As of Right Scenario does not include cuLtural facilities
EXHIBIT 7-7
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: EMPLOYMENT GENERATED, ALL MARKET CONDITIONS
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR =8) (FAR = 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
Construction Employment 74 93 111 130
Permanent Employment 353 452 551 650
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
EXHIBIT 7-8
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
zwzw=zzwz..=.X....S.=...... .=....... S...Z....a...z... a...... Zz... .. z...S
CITY ANALYSIS: PERSONAL TAX REVENUES, ALL MARKET CONDITIONS
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR = 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
Income Tax Revenues $55,273 $70,752 $86,231 $101,710
Sales Tax Revenues $6,377 $6,377 $6,377 $6,377
Total Personal Tax Revenues $61,650 S77,129 $92,608 $108,087
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
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10,000-SQUARE-FOOT PARCEL
A. Benefit of Incentive Zoning to the City
The benefits to the City for the 10,000-square-foot parcel, are one-quarter less for
real estate tax revenue, construction employment and sales tax revenue than for the
40,000-square-foot larger parcel. For permanent employment and income tax revenues the
benefit is slightly greater than one-quarter because of the different requirements for
cultural facility space. (Exhibits 7-6, 7-7 and 7-8).
Total fiscal impacts including real estate tax and property tax revenue vary depending
on market conditions and development levels. The City could potentially benefit from 1
million dollars in revenues in Strong Market conditions under Scenario 3. The estimated
revenues in Existing Market conditions under Scenario 3 are nearly comparable to those
calculated in Strong Market conditions under Scenario 1 (Exhibit 7-9).
B. Costs of Incentive Zoning to the City
Accordingly to the calculation of costs in the previous analysis for the 40,000-square-
foot parcel, the costs of incentive zoning are zero. (Exhibit 7-10).
C. Net Impact of Incentive Zoning to the City
The anticipated fiscal benefits to the City due to incentive zoning are far greater
than the associated cost of increased transit usage. Even though these revenues could
decline by fifty percent depending on local market conditions, the anticipated benefits are
still greater than the costs of increased transit usage and demand on city services.
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EXHIBIT 7-9
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: FISCAL IMPACTS-RE TAX REVENUES & PERSONAL TAX REVENUES, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARISON OF AS OR RIGHT WITH BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right' Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR = 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
Existing Market Conditions $407,721 $507,033 $606,345 $705,656
Weak Local Market Conditions $318,735 $396,295 $473,856 $551,415
Strong Local Market Conditions $581,080 $722,887 $864,694 S1,006,500
As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
EXHIBIT 7-10
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: TRANSPORTATION DEMAND, ALL MARKET CONDITIONS
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR a 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR a 14)
...............................................................................................
Employees Using Public Transit 106 136 165 195
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
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SUMMARY
The analysis above is based on several key assumptions that significantly affect the
calculation of net costs and benefits to the City. First, high office occupancy rates are
assumed to characterize additional development of the District. If new development is
leased slowly and fewer additional workers work downtown any corresponding drain on
existing infrastructure and public transportation facilities will be reduced. Alternatively, if
new development creates a transfer of employees from one part of Boston to another,
rather than a net increase, service costs also will be lower. Second, depending on the
method for assessing value of underutilized buildings, City real estate tax revenues may
also be lower than estimated. Third, because the analysis focuses on the impact of one
project rather than evaluating the aggregate of a number of projects, the benefits of
incentive zoning will always outweigh their associated costs. Finally, because the model
only considers the City's net revenues it does not consider the consequences of incentive
zoning to the environmental objectives of the city as a whole. To capture the net benefit
of the citizens of Boston, the boundary of the cost-benefit analysis has to be drawn more
broadly to include much more than the City's tax revenue interests.
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CHAPTER 8
INCENTIVE ZONING: THE OTHER PERSPECTIIVES
Of the three groups considered, an analysis of the incentive zoning from the
community's perspective is the least easily quantified. Nevertheless, the City should also
be concerned about the relative costs and benefits of the proposed zoning incentives on
interest groups other than developers and itself. As opposed to the economic calculations
of the previous two chapters, the analysis of the Chinatown, the arts community, and the
business community is a political one. Undoubtedly, the City will have to make tradeoffs
among the interests of these groups, but it should do so with as complete an understanding
as possible of the likely costs and benefits to each. In this section, the interest groups
most clearly affected by the proposed zoning policy and the costs and benefits for each are
qualitatively assessed. The chapter discusses the positive impacts of incentive zoning with
regard to cultural facilities, expanded business and employment opportunities, residential
development, and historic preservation. Externalities including appreciating property values,
increasing congestion, declining sunlight and diminishing public open space will also be
considered with respect to the Midtown boundaries.
A. Chinatown Community
The benefits of incentive zoning to the Chinatown community are expanded retail
opportunities, job training, affordable housing, and, although not explicitly stated by the
Midtown Cultural District Plan, eradication of the Combat Zone. Since Chinatown retail
rents are 15 dollars per square foot, and retail rents for this analysis were estimated at 35
dollars per square foot, changes in FAR beyond as of right could create additional
developer revenues, potentially providing subsidy to enable Chinatown retail to afford
expansion into the adjacent Cultural District. Additionally, linkage funds in the form of
job training and housing generated from supplemental commercial development of the
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District could be specifically designated for Chinatown residents. Lastly, elimination of the
Combat Zone as a result of more profitable uses, would improve the safety and physical
quality of the Chinatown community.
The costs to the Chinatown community include appreciating property values, increased
congestion, and deteriorating environmental conditions. The combination of rising land
values, low vacancy rates and the large number of renters in the neighborhood could lead
to gentrification and displacement of low income Chinatown tenants. Property owners in
Chinatown, however, would regard appreciation of property values as a benefit.
Development at any level in the area could further strain the already over-burdened
Chinatown street system. As a result, environmental impacts related to air quality and
access to sunlight and open space could be significant.
It is impossible to determine the precise magnitude of these issues without a specific
quantification on a building by budding basis for the entire District. However, if the
impact of property appreciation, increased traffic, and environmental spillover is greater
than the benefit of subsidy for retail establishments, net increase in linkage payments
beyond As of Right development, property appreciation to owners, and capital investment
for area-wide physical improvements, the negative consequences of incentive zoning
outweigh their associated benefits. Because of the potential for cumulative impacts over-
time, particularly pertaining to the impact of increased property values on renters, it would
not be surprising if the associated costs of incentive zoning turn out to be greater than
their benefits. Additionally, because this analysis only considers one parcel, many parcels
together would affect these impacts more than the simple sum of effects from individual
parcels.
B. Arts Community
The primary benefit of incentive zoning to the arts community is the provision of
cultural facilities. The proposed number and type of cultural facilities seeks to respond to
the varying administrative, rehearsal and performance needs of the performing and visual
arts groups of the city. Whether the cultural facilities as prescribed by the District Plan
will have any measurable increase on attendance at cultural events, creating additional arts
benefits rather than just transferring them from different locations remains to be seen, but
the provision of physical facilities is universally regarded as a benefit by the arts
community. 1 15
The costs of incentive zoning for the artists are the potential loss of control as a
result of facilities being part of privately developed mixed-use development projects. This
is not a cost in comparison to no facility at all, but it is a cost compared to an
unrestrained facility. Because developers have interest in the type and quality of groups
performing in their spaces, arts groups might have to allow private developers to determine
issues of programming and management of facilities.
On net, the impact to the arts community is positive. If the value of physical
facilities is equated to development cost, then the nine million dollar cost for providing
48,000 square feet of cultural facilities in Existing Market conditions under Scenario 3,
outweighs the loss of management and programming control. Alternatively the value of
cultural facility could be determined by the number of ticket sales at each facility or the
increased employment opportunities for visual and performing artists. Regardless of the
calculation method, the arts community is likely to support additional height and density if
the additional level of development encourages cultural objectives.
115 Additional benefits of increased audience attendance may include higher salaries
as a result of greater demand for performing and visual artists.
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C. Midtown Business Community
The benefits of incentive zoning to the Midtown business community are the expanded
business opportunities for new entrepreneurs not currently members part of the Midtown
business community, physical upgrading, and cultural facilities. Additional business
establishments located in the Midtown area, particularly to lower Washington Street area
would potentially create a critical mass of retail activity drawing people to the District.
Capital investment for streetscape improvements including public open space, outdoor
furniture and fighting could potentially lessen the negative perception of the Combat Zone.
And finally, cultural facilities will create a vibrant and appealing cultural and entertainment
environment attracting city residents and visitors from throughout the region. All these
benefits create value for the business community by contributing to a more desirable
economic, physical and social Midtown District.
The costs to the business community are the increased congestion and environmental
implications of development beyond as of right conditions. The impact of more crowded
surface streets and public transit and deteriorating air quality may dissuade potential
consumers from coming to the Cultural District.
D. Historic Preservationists
Historic preservationists, although not as important as the other groups, regard
incentive zoning as offering the potential for restoration of significant historic structures
in the District. The goals of this group are being met by proposed zoning requiring
rehabilitation of historic structures as one option in return for development beyond as of
right.
The costs to the historic buildings are the environmental consequences of additional
development. The impact of increased shadow and wind and deteriorated air quality would
negatively impact the District's low-scale historic structures.
The incremental increase in negative impacts as a result of incentive zoning is
minimal. Therefore, the potential for restoration of architecturally significant buildings
which otherwise would not occur is greater than the increase in negative impacts.
SUMMARY
In determining incentive zoning which is appropriate for the District as a whole, it is
important to account for its impact on each group in order to accurately determine the
policy's net impact. Three of the four groups analyzed illustrate the potential for
incentive zoning benefits to be greater than their associated costs. The negative
consequences to Chinatown may overwhelm the neighborhood benefit. Assuming maintaining
the Chinatown neighborhood is an important public policy, the City must address the need
to provide an appropriate incentive zoning tradeoff. Whether linkage contributions could
be required instead of cultural facilities has not been determined, but future discussions
should address this possible alternative.
122
CONCLUSION
When the BRA released preliminary zoning and a draft plan for the Midtown area on
July 14, 1988, neighborhood, business, arts, and development groups welcomed the long
awaited arrival of these Midtown documents. At last, they would have the opportunity to
critically review what the Boston Redevelopment Authority and the Office of Arts and
I lumanities have been planning for the last two years. Despite the optimism over these
public documents, uncertainty remains pertaining to specific implementation of the Cultural
District objectives.
The proposed incentive zoning formula is limited in its ability to stimulate cultural
development. Only when market conditions are strong and cultural development costs
relatively low does the zoning formula provide adequate subsidy to encourage the
development of cultural facilities. In both weak and existing market conditions, the cost
of building major cultural facilities far exceeds the benefit created by zoning.
On the other hand, once the District matures and rents rise to comparable levels of
downtown first-class office space, incentive zoning would be an effective policy alternative
for cultural development.
Such outcomes might suggest increasing the allowable FAR as a viable policy
alternative. However, in this context this change would be ineffective since, regardless of
project height, anticipated near-term, rents would not be great enough to compensate for
the development cost of additional office space.
As a result, the City must recognize the initial risk of development of the District
and ought to reassess its plan for exclusive reliance on the private sector. After
establishing realistic expectations of how much risk the private sector can assume, the City
should then formulate an appropriate public-private strategy for interim development of the
District.
Several financial tools are available whereby the City would share in the risks of the
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District's development. First, the City could assist in financing development by
establishing long-term lease agreements with Cultural District developers. If the City made
financial assistance directly, developers could leverage City leases to benefit from lower
front-end costs, reduced financing expenses and possibly higher equity returns. As a co-
developer of the parcel, the City would benefit from maintaining closer control of the
development, retaining a share in potential profits through rental income and appreciation
of property value, and having the political benefit of being a long-term participant in the
rebuilding of Midtown.1 16
Next, the City could make their tax-exempt borrowing status available to District
developers. Tax-increment revenue bonds are not a likely financing option for reasons
discussed previously. And the potential for access to other non-taxable bond funding such
as lease revenue bonds has been restricted by the 1986 Tax Act. However, tax-exempt
public financing sources that are available should be accessible to developers of the
District.
Without assuming full or partial ownership responsibility, the City could act as an
investor in the District's development. In return for assisting in financing of capital and
operating costs, the City could participate in future gross revenues, net cash flows or
retail rents. This technique could provide the opportunity for the City to share in District
returns by participating in both income and property taxation benefits.
In addition to these financial strategies, the City should reassess to what extent it is
reasonable to expect developers to assist in meeting the city's social objectives. The
proposed incentive zoning policy requiring cultural development in addition to existing
requirements for housing and job training linkage is financially excessive, given the
estimated returns for development of the District. The multiple demands of community
116. For an argument showing why this is desirable and how it is possible, see
Bernie J. Frieden and Lynne B. Sagalyn, Downtown Shopping Malls and the New Public-
Private Strategy, (MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning--unpublished), p. 22.
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groups need to be effectively managed to determine an appropriate public amenity
contribution level for District developers.
Ultimately, the City may need to engage in deal-making with the private sector,
combining the strategies discussed above. Such negotiating could potentially involve the
establishment of a new independent public authority specifically responsible for overseeing
the District's development. Regardless of the administrative development structure, for the
City to obtain the larger, more costly cultural facilities, final agreements must focus on
lessening the private sector share of the cost of public benefit. For the City to
demonstrate its commitment to cultural objectives, it must be willing to invest its own
funds in the development risks of the area.
The Cultural District project is an important opportunity to bring together community
needs and private development objectives to attain a cultural vision. The multifaceted plan
for residential, commercial and cultural development carefully articulates the objectives of
each of these groups. Without an increased share of the development responsibility carried
by the public sector, however, requiring cultural facilities in return for bonus space in a
downzoned, depressed, development area is unreasonable and makes attainment of the
Cultural District in the current market infeasible.
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INTERVIEWS
Simone Auster; Vice President Community Development, Greater Boston Chamber of
Commerce
Barbara Barros; Boston Redevelopment Authority
Rita Caviglia; Boston Redevelopment Authority
Larry DiCara; Dicara, Selig, Sawyer and Holt
Antonio DiMambro; Comunitas
Tarry Hum; Executive Director, Chinatown Neighborhood Council
Bethany Kendall; Executive Vice President, Downtown Crossing Association
Rebecca Lee; Rebecca A. Lee & Associates
Ann Levine; Director of Planning, New England Medical Center
David Ross; Director, Institute of Contemporary Art
Catherine Royce; Director of Industries and Cultural Facilities, City Office of the Arts and
Humanities
Jeane Muller Ryan; Treasurer, Boston Theatre District Association
Peter Schlesinger; Boston Redevelopment Authority
Eric Schmidt; Boston Redevelopment Authority
Donna Summer; Executive Director, Stage Source
Diana Tracey; Benjamin Thompson Associates
Alex Twining; Senior Vice President, F.D. Rich Company
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APPENIX EXHIBIT 1-1
FIVE FORMS OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
FORM OF CITY NAME OF MANE OF PUBLIC SECTOR
DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPENT ARTS FACILITY TOOLS
CULTURAL New Haven, Shubert Theater City Funding
FACILITY Cannecticut Economic Dewetment Actions Grant
Tax Shelter Syndication
Non-Profit Corporation
MIXED-USE New York, Museum of Modern Art/ Musei of Modern Art Sale of Air Rights
BUILDING Mew York Residential Tower Trust for Cultural Resources
Payent In lieu of Taxes from
Developed Property
MIXED-USE Costs Mesa, South Coast Plaza South Coast Land & Financial Donors
DEVELOPMENT California Repertory Theater Tax Exempt Bonds
(200 Acres) Orange Caity Waived Building Fees
Performing Arts Center FAR Exemztions for Cultural
California Scenario Cmponent
MIXED-USE San Diego,
DEVELOPMENT Cal ifornia
(11 Acres)
Morton Plaza Lyces% Theater
San Diego Art Center
Tax Allocation Bonda
Urban Developnt Action Grant
Tax Increment Financing
Non-Profit Centre City
Development Corporation
Morton Plaza Theatres Foudation
MIXED-USE Sen Francisco, Yerba Buena Garden. Yerbe Buena Gardens Public Agency Assumed Operating
DEVELOPMENT California Cultural Center Costs of Cultural Facilities
(Proposed) (11 Acres)
CULTURAL New York, South Street Seaport South Street Seaport Urban Development Action Grant
CENTER New York Muem State/City Assistance in Land
(4 Acres) Assembly
Transfer Air Rights
Federal Grants
Special Zoning District
Non-Profit Corporation
CULTURAL
CENTER
Winston-Salem, Winston Square Steven's Center for Investment Tax Credits
North Carolina Arts Complex Performing Arts General Revenue Sharing Funds
Sawtooth Center for Commnity Development Block Grant
Visual Design
Winston Square Park
Special Theater Uris Theater
District Minskoff Theater
American Place Theater
Pittsburgh, Downtown Cultural
Pennsylvania District
Dallas Musee of Art
Morton N. Myerson--
Symphony Center
Dallas Theater Center
LTV Pavittion
Reinz alt
Bened.I Center
(Stanley Theater)
Fulton Theater
Special District Zoning with
Neight Bonuses for Preservation
or Devetopment of Theaters
Local Foundation Grants
Urban Developent Action Grant
County Economic Daveopent Action
Grant
State Funding
Non-Profit Corporation
General Obligation Bonds
Economic Developmnt Assistance
Bond Funding
City Subsidizes Capital Costs &
Operating Costs
Endoment Investment
Allocation of Real Estate Taxes
to Cultural District Developent
City-County Bord
Urban Developent Action Grant
Transfer Air rights
Trust for Cultural Resources
Source: The City as a Stage: Strategies for the Arts in Urban Economics,
National EndoMnt for the Arts Design Arts Program, 1983
Cultural Facilities in Mixed-Use Development, Urban Land Institute, Washington, D.C., 1985,
Arts Spaces and Economic Davelopent Experience In Six Cities, Project for Livable Places, 1986.
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New York,
New York
ClevelIand, Playhouse Square State Theater
Chio Palace Theater
(60 Acres) Ohio Theater
CULTURAL
DISTRICT
CULTURAL
DISTRICT
CULTURAL
DISTRICT
CULTURAL
DISTRICT
Dot taa,
Texas
(61.7 Acres)
Dallas Arts District
Appendix Exhibit 2-1 NATIONAL REGISTER DISTRICTS & INDIVIDUAL LISTINGS
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 5-1
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
SUMMARY OF PROGRAM ASSUMPTIONS, HYPOTHETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 40,000 SF PARCEL, WEAK LOCAL MARKET CONDITIONS
u0uau.aum.. nowuuau . auuu~u..uuu.a~u...uauu.u. u*uuu~~~u~u=.
As of Right Scenario*:
FAR
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
Scenario 1:
20,000
17,800
300,000
285,000
320,000
302,800
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
Scenario 2: Scenario 3:
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
20,000
17,800
460,000
437,000
32,210
25,768
512,210
480,568
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
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20,000
17,800
380,000
361,000
16,105
12,884
416,105
391,684
20,000
17,800
540,000
513,000
48,315
38,652
608,315
569,452
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 5-2
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
SUMMARY OF PROGRAM ASSUMPTIONS, DEVELOPMENT OF 40,000 SF PARCEL, STRONG LOCAL MARKET CONDITIONS
As of Right Scenario*: Scenario 1:
FAR 8 FAR 10
RETAIL
Gross Retail gaf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gaf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
20,000
17,800
300,000
285,000
320,000
302,800
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
Scenario 2: Scenario 3:
FAR 12 FAR 14
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
20,000
17,800
460,000
437,000
32,458
25,966
512,458
480,766
RETAIL
Gross Retail gaf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
20,000
17,800
380,000
361,000
16,229
12,983
416,229
391,783
20,000
17,800
540,000
513,000
48,687
38,950
608,687
569,750
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 5-3
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
SUMMARY OF PROGRAM ASSUMPTIONS, DEVELOPMENT OF 10,000 SF PARCEL, WEAK LOCAL MARKET CONDITIONS
As of Right Scenario*: Scenario 1:
FAR 8 FAR 10
RETAIL
Gross Retail gaf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gaf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gaf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
5,000
4,450
75,000
71,250
0
0
80,000
75,700
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gaf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gaf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
Scenario 2: Scenario 3:
FAR 12 FAR 14
RETAIL
Gross Retail gaf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
5,000
4,450
115,000
109,250
16,068
12,854
136,068
126,554
RETAIL
Gross Retail gaf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
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5,000
4,450
95,000
90,250
8,034
6,427
108,034
101,127
5,000
4,450
135,000
128,250
24,102
19,282
164,102
151,982
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 5-4
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
SUMMARY OF PROGRAM ASSUMPTIONS, DEVELOPMENT OF 10,000 SF PARCEL, STRONG LOCAL MARKET CONDITIONS
As of Right Scenario*: Scenario 1:
FAR 8 FAR 10
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gaf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
5,000
4,450
75,000
71,250
80,000
75,700
RETAIL
Gross Retail gaf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
Scenario 2: Scenario 3:
FAR 12 FAR 14
RETAIL
Gross Retail gaf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
Office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
5,000
4,450
115,000
109,250
16,229
12,983
136,229
126,683
RETAIL
Gross Retail gsf
Net Retail 50% Gd nsf
OFFICE
office gsf
Net Office nsf
CULTURAL
Gross Cultural gsf
Cultural Facilities nsf
TOTAL GROSS BUILDING AREA gsf
TOTAL NET BUILDING AREA nsf
-~==33 33====-~==3==333====3===3===3  3=3=3=3=3=3=3-----------------
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
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5,000
4,450
95,000
90,250
8,114
6,491
108,114
101,191
5,000
4,450
135,000
128,250
24,343
19,474
164,343
152,174
APPENDII EIEIBIT 6-1
KIDTOVI/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTOI, KASS., 1988
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS, EISTING KARKET COODITIONS, 40,000 SP PARCEL
As of Right
Office Reat Land Residual Cap Rate Land Residual
($627,245) ($627,245)
$27.00 ($627,245) 8.00% $8,057,619
$27.50 $440,379 8.25% $6,846,007
$28.00 $1,479,502 8.50% $5,671,645
$28.50 $2,518,341 8.75% $4,534,174
$29.00 $3,556,559 9.00% $3,432,969
$29.50 $4,594,765 9.25% $2,367,213
$30.00 $5,632,958 9.50% $1,335,958
$30.50 $6,671,150 9.75% $338,169
$31.00 $7,709,342 10.00% ($627,245)
$31.50 $8,747,534 10.25% ($1,561,401)
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APPEN01 EIIBIT 6-2
NITOWI/CULTORAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, KASS., 1988
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS, EUSTING NARIET CONDITIOIS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
FAR = 10
Office Rent let Cap. Value
BonAs Space/SF
$27.00
$27.50
$28.00
$28.50
$29.00
$29.50
$30.00
$30.50
$31.00
$31.50
($81)
($81)
($64)
($48)
($31)
($15)
$2
$18
$35
$51
$68
Cap Rate let Cap. Value
Boats Space/SF
8.00%
8.25%
8.50%
8.75%
9.001
9.25%
9.50%
9.751
10.001
10.25%
($81)
$57
$37
$19
$1
($17)
($34)
($50)
($66)
($81)
($96)
SF Cost Caltaral let Cap, Value
Facility BoAus Space/SP
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$220
$240
FAR =12
Office Rent let Cap. Value
Bonus Space/SF
$27.00
$27.50
$28.00
$28.50
$29.00
$29.50
$30.00
$30.50
$31.00
$31.50
($81)
($81)
($71)
($61)
($51)
($41)
($30)
($20)
($10)
($0)
$10
Cap Rate let Cap. Value
BonAs Space/SF
8.00%
8.251
8.50%
8.75%
9.00%
9.25%
9.50%
9.75%
10.00%
10.25%
($81)
$3
($9)
($20)
($31)
($12)
($52)
($62)
($72)
($81)
($90)
SF Cost Caltural let Cap. Value
Facility Bonas Space/SF
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$220
$240
FAR =14
Office Rent let Cap. Value
Bonus Space/SF
$29.00
$29.50
$30.00
$30.50
$31.00
$31.50
$32.00
$32.50
$33.00
$33.50
($81)
($49)
($41)
($33)
($26)
($18)
($10)
($2)
$6
$14
$22
Cap Rate let Cap, Value
Bonus Space/SF
6.00%
6.25%
6.50%
6.75%
7.00%
7.25%
7.50%
7.75%
8.00%
8.25%
($81)
$69
$57
$46
$35
$24
$14
$4
($6)
($16)
($25)
137
SF Cost Caltural let Cap. Value
Facility Bonus Space/SF
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$220
$240
($81)
($67)
($71)
($74)
($76)
($78)
($79)
($80)
($81)
($81)
($82)
($81)
($65)
($70)
($74)
($76)
($78)
($79)
($80)
($81)
($82)
($82)
($81)
($66)
($71)
($74)
($76)
($78)
($79)
($80)
($81)
($81)
($82)
APPEIDI 8181BIT 6-3
KIDTOVI/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTOM, KASS., 1988
SEISITIVITY ADALYSIS, IRA[ LOCAL KARET COIDITIOIS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
As of Right
Office Rent Land Residual
$27.00
$27.50
$28.00
$28.50
$29.00
$29.50
$30.00
$30.50
$31.00
$31.50
($12,421,096)
($7,351,597)
($6,566,700)
($5,657,943)
($4,751,279)
($3,841,955)
($2,932,649)
($2,023,286)
($1,113,922)
($204,558)
$704,807
Cap Rate Land Residual
6.00%
6.251
6.50%
6.75%
7.00%
7.25%
7.50%
7.75%
8.001
8.25%
($12,421,096)
$8,705,615
$7,478,532
$6,258,369
$5,053,718
$3,870,652
$2,713,376
$1,584,706
$486,419
($580,479)
($1,615,557)
APPEIDII 19191?5 6-4
IIDTONI/CULTORAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, lASS., 1988
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS, 1EAL LOCAL KAREE COIDITIOIS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
FAR = 10
Office Rent let Cap. Value
Bonn. Space/SF
$27.00
$27.50
$28.00
$28.50
$29.00
$29.50
$30.00
$30.50
$31.00
$31.50
($117)
($38)
($24)
($9)
$5
$20
$34
$49
$63
$77
$92
Cap. Rate let Cap. Value SF Cost Cultural
Bonus Space/SF Facility
8.00%
8.251
8.501
8.751
9.001
9.25%
9.50%
9.751
10.001
10.251
($117)
$71
$54
$38
$23
$8
($6)
($20)
($34)
($47)
($59)
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$220
$240
FAR =12
Office Rent Net Cap. Yalue
Bonus Space/SF
$27.00
$27.50
$28.00
$28.50
$29.00
$29.50
$30.00
$30.50
$31.00
$31.50
($117)
($70)
($61)
($52)
($44)
($35)
($26)
($17)
($8)
$0
$9
Cap. Rate let Cap. Value SF Coat Caltural
Bonus Space/SF Facility
6.00%
6.25%
6.50%
6.751
7.00%
7.25%
7.50%
7.75%
8.00%
8.25%
($117)
$87
$75
$63
$51
$39
$28
$17
$6
($4)
($14)
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$220
$240
FAR = 14
Office Rent let Cap. Value
Bonns Space/SF
$29.00
$29.50
$30.00
$30.50
$31.00
$31.50
$32.00
$32.50
$33.00
$33.50
($118)
($53)
($46)
($39)
($32)
($25)
($18)
($11)
($5)
$2
$9
Cap. Rate Net Cap. Value SF Cost Cultural
Bonus Space/SF Facility
6.001
6.25%
6.50%
6.75%
7.00%
7.25%
7.50%
7.751
8.00%
8.251
($118)
$43
$33
$23
$14
$5
($4)
($13)
($21)
($29)
($37)
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$220
$240
get Cap. Value
Bonas Space/SF
($117)
($106)
($110)
($112)
($113)
($115)
($115)
($116)
($117)
($117)
($117)
Net Cap. Value
Bonas Space/SF
($117)
($108)
($111)
($113)
($114)
($115)
($116)
($117)
($117)
($118)
($118)
Net Cap. Value
Bonus Space/SF
($118)
($109)
($112)
($114)
($115)
($116)
($117)
($117)
($118)
($118)
($119)
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 6-5
KIDTOI/CULTORAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, KASS., 1988
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS, STRONG LOCAL KARET CONDITIOIS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
FAR = 10
Office Rent let Cap. Value
Boats Space/SF
$32.00
$32.50
$33.00
$33.50
$34.00
$34.50
$35.00
$35.50
$36.00
$36.50
($10)
($26)
($6)
$13
$32
$70
$89
$108
$127
$146
Cap Rate Net Cap. Valle
Bons Space/SF
7.00%
7.25%
7.50%
7.751
8.00%
8.25%
8.50%
8.751
9.001
9.251
($10)
$145
$117
$90
$64
$38
$14
($10)
($33)
($56)
($77)
SF Cost Caltaral let Cap. Value
Facility Bonas Space/SF
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$220
$240
($10)
$46
$38
$30
$22
$14
$6
($10)
($18)
($27
FAR =12
Office Rent Net Cap. Value
Bonus Space/SF
$32.00
$32.50
$33.00
$33.50
$34.00
$34.50
$35.00
$35.50
$36.00
$36.50
( $11)
($20)
($8)
$3
$15
$27
$38
$50
$61
$73
$85
Cap Rate let Cap. Value
Boas Space/SF
7.001
7.25%
7.501
7.75%1
8.001
8.25%
8.50%
8.75%
9.00%
9.25%
($11)
$84
$67
$50
$34
$19
$4
($11)
($25)
($38)
($51)
SF Cost Caltaral let Cap. Value
Facility Bonus Space/SF
($11)
$60 $16
$80 $y
$100 $2
$120 ($2)
$140 ($5)
$160 ($7)
$180 ($9(
$200 (11)
$220 ($12)
$240 ($13)
FAR = 14
Office Rent let Cap. Value
Bonas Space/SF
$32.00
$32.50
133.00
$33.50
$34.00
$34.50
$35.00
$35.50
$36.00
$36.50
($11)
($18)
($9)
$0
$9
$18
$28
$37
$46
$55
$64
Cap Rate Net Cap. Value
Bonus Space/SF
7.00%
7.25%
7.50%
7.75%
8.00%
8.25%
8.50%
8.75%
9.00%
9.251
($11)
$63
$50
$37
$24
$12
$1
($11)
($22)
($32)
($43)
SF Cost Caltural let Cap. Value
Facility Boats Space/SF
($11)
60 $14
80 $6
100 $
120 ($)
140 ($6)
160 ($)
180 ($9)
200 ($11)
220 ($2
240 ($3
140
APPEIDII KIRIBIT 6-6
KIDTOI/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTO, KASS., 1988
SEISITIYITY ANALYSIS, EXISTING KARKET CONDITIOIS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
As of Right
Office Rent Land Residual Cap Rate Land Residual
($12,897,196) ($12,897,196)
$27.00 ($156,811) 8.00% $2,014,349
$27.50 $110,095 8.25% $1,711,470
$28.00 $369,876 8,50% $1,417,910
$28.50 $629,585 8.751 $1,133,543
$29.00 $889,140 9.00% $858,242
$29.50 $1,148,691 9.25% $591,803
$30.00 $1,408,239 9.501 $333,989
$30.50 $1,667,787 9.75% $84,542
$31.00 $1,927,335 10.001 ($156,811)
$31.50 $2,186,883 10.25% ($390,350)
APPINDII 8IBI? 6-7
RITOI/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOST01, KASS., 1988
SRISITIVITY ANALYSIS, 1BUSTIN MARBT COIDITIONS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
FAR = 10
Office Rent let Cap. Value
Bonns Space/SF
$27.00
$27.50
$28.00
$28.50
$29.00
$29.50
$30.00
$30.50
$31.00
$31.50
($73)
($73)
($57)
($40)
($23)
($6)
$10
$27
$44
$60
$77
Office Rent get Cap. Valae
Bonas Space/SF
$27.00
$27.50
$28.00
$28.50
$29.00
$29.50
$30.00
$30.50
$31.00
$31.50
($74)
($74)
($64)
($53)
($43)
($33)
($23)
($13)
($2)
$8
$18
Cap Rate get Cap. Value
Boas Space/SF
8.00%
8.251
8.50%
8.751
9.00%
9.25%
9.50%
9. 751
10.00%
10.25%
($73)
$69
$49
$29
$11
($7)
($41)
($58)
($73)
($88)
Cap Rate let Cap. Valae
Bonas Space/SF
8.00%
8.251
8.50%
8.75%
9.00%
9.25%
9.50%
9.75%
10.001
10.25%
($74)
$13
($11)
($22)
($33)
($44)
($54)
($64)
($74)
($83)
SF Cost Caltural Net Cap. Value
Facility Bonns Space/SF
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$220
$240
($73)
($64)
($70)
($73)
($80)
($81)
($81)
($82)
SF Cost Cultural let Cap. Value
Facility Bonus Space/SF
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$220
$240
($74)
($66)
($71)
(74)
($76)
($78)
($79)
($80)
($81)
($81)
($82)
FR = 14
Office Rent Net Cap. Value
Bonus Space/SF
$29.00
$29.50
$30.00
$30.50
$31.00
$31.50
$32.00
$32.50
$33.00
$33.50
(74)
($42)
(34)
($20
($18)
($10)
($2)
$6
$14
$2
$00
Cap Rate let Cap. Valae
Bonaus Space/SF
6.00%
6.25%
6.50%
6.75%
7.00%
7.25%
7.50%
7.75%
8.00%
8.25%
($71)
$87
$74
$61
$49
$38
$26
$15
$5
($15)
SF Cost Cultural let Cap. Value
Facility Bonaus Space/SF
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$220
$240
($74)
($67)
($74)($76)
($78)
($79)
($80)
($81)
($81)
($82)
APPENDII EIIBIT 6-8
KIDTOVI/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTOI, lKASS., 1988
SENSITIVITY AIALYSIS, 1EAK LOCAL KARET COIDITIOIS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
As of Right
Office Reat Laid Residnal Cap. Rate Laid Residual
($3,075,471) ($3,075,471)
$27.00 ($1,808,096) 6.00% $2,206,207
$27.50 ($1,611,872) 6.251 $1,899,436
$28.00 ($1,384,683) 6.501 $1,594,396
$28.50 ($1,158,017) 6.751 $1,293,233
$29.00 ($930,685) 7.00% $997,466
$29.50 ($703,359) 7.251 $708,147
$30.00 ($476,018) 7.501 $425,980
$30.50 ($248,677) 7.75% $151,408
$31.00 ($21,336) 8.001 ($115,317)
$31.50 $206,005 8.25% ($374,086)
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APPENDIX EIIBIT 6-9
IDYTOVI/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, KASS., 1988
SENSITIVITY AIALYSIS, VI[ LOCAL KARE!T CONDITIONS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
FA = 10
Office Rent let Cap. Value
Bonus Space/SF
$27.00
$27.50
$28.00
$28.50
$29.00
$29.50
$30.00
$30.50
$31.00
$31.50
($113)
($34)
($20)
($5)
$9
$24
$39
$53
$68
$82
$97
Cap. Rate let Cap. Valle SF Cost Cultural
Bonus Space/SF Facility
8.00%
8.251
8.50%
8.75%
9.001
9.251
9.50%
9.75%
10.00%
10.25%
($113)
$79
$62
$46
$30
$14
($0)
($15)
($29)
($41)
($55)
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$220
$240
FAR : 12
Office Rent let Cap. Value
Bonus Space/SF
$27.00
$27.50
$28.00
$28.50
$29.00
$29.50
$30.00
$30.50
$31.00
$31.50
($114)
($65)
($57)
($48)
($39)
($30)
($21)
($12)
($3)
$6
$15
Cap. Rate let Cap. Value SF Cost Cultaral
Bonus Space/SF Facility
6.00%
6.25%
6.50%
6.75%
7.00%
7.25%
7.50%
7.75%
8.00%
8.25%
($114)
$103
$89
$76
$63
$50
$38
$27
$15
$4
($6)
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$220
$240
Office Rent let Cap. Value
Bonus Space/SF
$27.00
$27.50
$28.00
$28.50
$29.00
$29.50
$30.00
$30.50
$31.00
$31.50
($115)
($77)
($70)
($63)
($56)
($49)
($42)
($35)
($28)
($21)
($14)
Cap. Rate let Cap. Value SF Cost Cultural
Bonus Space/SF Facility
6.00%
6.251
6.501
6.75%
7.001
7.251
7.50%
7.751
8.00%
8,25%
($115)
$57
$46
$35
$25
$15
$5
($4)
($13)
($22)
($30)
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
$200
$220
$240
let Cap. Valle
Bonus Space/SF
($113)
($107)
($111)
($113)
($115)
($116)
($117)
($118)
($118)
($119)
Net Cap. Value
Bouus Space/SF
($114)
($108)
($112)
($114)
($115)
($116)
($117)
($117)
($118)
($118)
($119)
let Cap. Value
Bonus Space/SF
($115)
($110)
($113)
($115)
($116)
($117)
($118)
($118)
($119)
($119)
($120)
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 7-1
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: REAL ESTATE TAX REVENUES, EXISTING MARKET CONDTIONS, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario I Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR = 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR =14)
............................................................................................
Effective Gross Income $7,902,100 $9,851,500 $11,800,900 $13,750,300
Net Operating Income(1) $6,393,920 $7,942,800 $9,491,680 $11,040,560
Capitalized Value $63,939,200 $79,428,000 $94,916,800 $110,405,600
Real Estate Tax Revenue $1,384,284 $1,719,616 $2,054,949 $2,390,281
...................................................................
Net Increase in Revenue
to City Above As of Right $335,333 $670,665 $1,005,998
* As of Right Scenario does not include culturaL facilities
(1) NOI before Linkage, before taxes
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 7-2
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: REAL ESTATE TAX REVENUES, WEAK LOCAL MARKET CONDITIONS, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR = 10) (FAR =12) (FAR = 14)
Effective Gross Income $6,962,166 $8,679,690 $10,397,214 $12,114,738
Net Operating Income(1) $5,462,304 $6,781,360 $8,100,416 $9,419,472
Capitalized Value $47,498,296 $58,968,348 $70,438,400 $81,908,452
Real Estate Tax Revenue $1,028,338 $1,276,665 $1,524,991 $1,773,318
Net Increase in Revenue
to City Above As of Right $248,327 $496,653 $744,980
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
(1) NOI before linkage, before taxes
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT 7-3
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: REAL ESTATE TAX REVENUES, STRONG LOCAL MARKET CONDITIONS, YEAR 3
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR = 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
Effective Gross Income $9,682,152 $12,070,680 $14,459,208 $16,847,736
Net Operating Income(1) $8,157,336 $10,141,240 $12,125,144 $14,109,048
Capitalized Value $95,968,659 $119,308,706 $142,648,753 $165,988,800
Real Estate Tax Revenue $2,077,721 $2,583,033 $3,088,346 $3,593,658
Net Increase in Revenue
to City Above As of Right $505,312 $1,010,624 $1,515,936
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
(1) NOI before linkage, before taxes
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 7-4
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: EMPLOYMENT GENERATED, ALL MARKET CONDITIONS
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR = 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
Hard Costs $38,480,000 $48,000,000 $57,520,000 $67,040,000
Percent of Hard Costs For Wage $8,850,400 $11,040,000 $13,229,600 $15,419,200
Total Number of Construction Jobs 297 371 445 518
Net Increase in Construction
Jobs Above As of Right 74 147 221
Total Number of Permanent Jobs 1,414 1,793 2,173 2,553
Net Increase in Permanent
Jobs Above As of Right 380 760 1,139
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
(1) Based on $29,760 average construction wage, 1986 Area Wage Survey of the Construction Industry
(2) Based on 220 SF/office employee, 400 SF/retail employee, 1000 SF/cultural employee, BRA Research Department
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT 7-5
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: PERSONAL TAX REVENUES, ALL MARKET CONDITIONS, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARISON OF AS OR RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR a:8) (FAR a310) (FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
1. Population Statistics
Total Number of Permanent 1,414 1,793 2,173 2,553
II. Income Tax Revenues
Average Taxable Income(1) $26,010,909 $32,998,454 $39,985,998 $46,973,543
State Income Tax Revenues
2 5% Tax Rate $1,300,545 $1,649,923 $1,999,300 $2,348,677
City Revenues--17% of State Income
Tax Revenues Allocated to City $221,093 $280,487 $339,881 $399,275
111. Sales Tax Revenues
Retail Employees 50 50 50 50
Retail Sales Volune(3) $3,000,750 $3,000,750 $3,000,750 $3,000,750
State Sales Tax Revenues
2 5% Tax Rate $150,038 $150,038 $150,038 $150,038
City Revenues--17% of State Sales
Tax Revenues Allocated toCity $25,506 $25,506 $25,506 $25,506
Total Boston Benefit $246,599 $305,993 $365,387 $424,781
Increase in Personal Tax Revenues
Above As of Right $59,394 $118,788 $178,182
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
(1) Based on average annual income of $23,000 & assumes 80% is taxable, BRA Research Department
(2) Based on discussion with Gregory Perkins, BRA Research Department
(3) Sales/employee equated $60,015 in 1986, BRA Research Department
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT 7-6
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION DEMAND, ALL MARKET CONDITIONS
COMPARISON OF AS OR RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 40,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR = 10) (FAR . 12) (FAR = 14)
Net Building Area 302,800 391,697 480,594 569,492
Number of Permanent Employees 1,414 1,793 2,173 2,553
Employees Using Public Transit 424 538 652 766
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
(1) 30% of downtown employees use public transit, BRA Research Department
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 7-7
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: REAL ESTATE TAX REVENUES, EXISTING MARKET CONDITIONS, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARSON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR = 10)
Effective Gross Income $1,975,525 $2,462,875
Net Operating Income(1)
Capitalized Value
$1,598,480
$15,984,800
$1,985,700
$19,857,000
Scenario 2
(FAR = 12)
$2,950,225
$2,372,920
$23,729,200
Scenario 3
(FAR = 14)
$3,437,575
$2,760,140
$27,601,400
Real Estate Tax Revenue $346,071 $429,904 $513,737 $597,570
Net Increase in Revenue
to City Above As of Right $83,833 $167,666 S251,499
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
(1) NOI before linkage, before taxes
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT 7-8
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: REAL ESTATE TAX REVENUES, WEAK LOCAL MARKET CONDITIONS, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR = 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR = 14)
Effective Gross Income $1,740,542 $2,169,922 $2,599,304 $3,028,685
Net Operating Income(1) $1,365,576 $1,695,340 $2,025,104 $2,354,868
Capitalized Value $11,874,574 $14,742,087 $17,609,600 $20,477,113
Real Estate Tax Revenue $257,085 $319,166 $381,248 $443,329
Net Increase in Revenue
to City Above As of Right $62,082 $124,163 $186,245
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
(1) NOI before linkage, before taxes
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 7-9
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: REAL ESTATE TAX REVENUES, STRONG LOCAL MARKET CONDITIONS, STABILIZED YEAR OF OPERATION
COMPARISON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR = 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR a214)
....................................................................................................
Effective Gross Income $2,420,538 $3,017,670 $3,614,802 $4,211,934
Net Operating Income(1) $2,039,334 $2,535,310 $3,031,286 $3,527,262
Capitalized Value S23,992,165 $29,827,176 $35,662,188 $41,497,200
Real Estate Tax Revenue $519,430 $645,758 $772,086 $898,414
Net Increase in Revenue
to City Above As of Right $126,328 $252,656 $378,984
As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
(1) NOI before linkage, before taxes
149
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 7-10
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: EMPLOYMENT GENERATED, ALL MARKET CONDITIONS
COMPARSON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR = 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR =14)
Hard Costs $9,620,000 $12,000,000 $14,380,000 $16,760,000
Percent of Hard Costs For Wages $2,212,600 $2,760,000 $3,307,400 $3,854,800
Total Number of Construction Jobs(1) 74 93 111 130
Net Increase in Jobs
Above As of Right 18 37 55
Total Number of Permanent Jobs(2) 353 452 551 650
Net Increase in Jobs
Above As of Right 99 198 297
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
(1) Based on $29,760 average construction wage, 1986 Area Wage Survey of the Construction Industry
(2) Based on 220 SF/office employee, 400 SF/retail employee, 1000 SF/cultural employee, BRA Research Department
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EXHIBIT 7-11
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, NASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: PERSONAL TAX REVENUES, ALL MARKET CONDITIONS, YEAR 3
COMPARSON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR =8) (FAR =510) (FAR =12) (FAR =:14)
I. Population Statistics
Total Number of Permanent Employe 353 452 551 650
II. Income Tax Revenues
Average Taxable Income(1) $6,502,727 $8,323,772 $10,144,817 $11,965,862
State Income Tax Revenues
a 5% Tax Rate $325,136 $416,189 S507,241 $598,293
City Revenues--17% of State Income
Tax Revenues Allocated to Bosto S55,273 $70,752 $86,231 $101,710
111. Sales Tax Revenues
Retail Employees 13 13 13 13
Retail Sales Volume(3) $750,188 $750,188 $750,188 $750,188
State Sales Tax Revenues
a 5% Tax Rate $37,509 $37,509 $37,509 $37,509
City Revenues--17% of State Sates
Tax Revenues Allocated to Bosto $6,377 $6,377 $6,377 $6,377
Total Boston Benefit $61,650 $77,129 $92,608 $108,086
increase in Personal Tax Revenues
Above As of Right $15,479 $30,958 $46,437
* As of Right Scenario does not include cuLtural facilities
(1) Based on average annual income of S23,000 & assumes 80% is taxable, BRA Research Department
(2) Based on discussion with Gregory Perkins, BRA Research Department
(3) Sales/employee equated $60,015 in 1986, BRA Research Department
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 7-12
MIDTOWN/CULTURAL DISTRICT, BOSTON, MASS., 1988
CITY ANALYSIS: PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION DEMAND, ALL MARKET CONDITIONS
COMPARSON OF AS OF RIGHT AND BONUS DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS, 10,000 SF PARCEL
CASE: As of Right* Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
FAR: (FAR = 8) (FAR = 10) (FAR = 12) (FAR = 15)
Net Building Area 75,700 101,149 126,597 152,046
Number of Permanent Employees 353 452 551 650
Employees Using Public Transit(1) 106 136 165 195
* As of Right Scenario does not include cultural facilities
(1) 30% of downtown employees use public transit, BRA Research Department
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